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This was not always the case: for physicists in the era of Newton or Descartes, intuitive conceptions played a more central role, and the mathematics simply provided useful accessories to that core. But today, many fundamental principles governing the physical world are well-understood, and such non-intuitive conceptions as "light behaves like both particles and waves", "heat is the movement of molecules", the relativistic equivalence of energy and mass, or the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics are taken for granted as truths to which scientists' intuitions must simply adapt (Feynman, 1965; Gribbin, 2002) . This is the insight at the heart of Mermin's famous dictum regarding quantum mechanics: "shut up and calculate!" (Mermin, 1989) . This primacy of formal, mathematical models over prescientific intuitive conceptions and analogies is perhaps the clearest indication that physics is a mature science. A maturing cognitive science must eventually undergo a similar conceptual transition, acknowledging the primacy of formal and quantitative models over the metaphoric and intuitive "folk psychological" models that still dominate our discipline (Churchland, 2008) .
Metaphoric versus Formal Computational Models in the Cognitive Sciences
There is of course nothing new in my suggestion that the cognitive sciences should embrace computational theory and formal models (e.g., Arbib and Caplan, 1979; Poeppel and Embick, 2005) . What is novel in this paper is the specific framework I will advocate, which in a nutshell is cellular, computational and predictive, and the perspective I adopt, which is biological and comparative (treating empirically-evaluated similarities and differences between species as crucial sources of information for cognitive science). I will argue that success in this formalization enterprise will require triangulation between three disciplines: neuroscience (providing the firm physical foundations of brain function), the cognitive sciences (including cognitive and mathematical psychology, linguistics and musicology) and cognitive biology (providing a comparative viewpoint), and that the bridging functions between all three domains should build upon the insights of computer science (theories of computability and algorithms).
My point of departure will be Marr's (1982) tri-partite approach to vision ( Fig 1A) , which advocates separate specifications of the problem (what Marr terms "computation"), of the problem-solving approach ("algorithm"), and of algorithmic instantiation in neural circuitry ("implementation") . But rather than mapping the three disciplines onto Marr's hierarchy of computation/algorithm/implementation, I will suggest that each interdisciplinary bridge must incorporate explanations at each Marrian level (cf. Rolls and Deco, 2001) . My notion of "computation" is thus more fundamental, and more pervasive, than Marr's, and goes beyond simply "stating the problem" to incorporate all that modern computer science has to teach about which problems are simple, challenging, or intractable, and about what classes of algorithms can solve each type. Thus, although the framework outlined here accepts the importance of Marr's explanatory levels as originally described, I call for a revision in the manner in which they are used (cf. Poggio, 2012) , and I argue against the now standard separation of computational accounts from implementational ones ( Fig 1B) . Instead, the insights of modern computer science permeate all three of Marr's levels, and his conception of "computational theory" was too narrow and confined to the most abstract level.
The general structure of the computational framework I advocate here is shown in Figure 1C , which illustrates the need for productive interdisciplinary bridges between three disciplines, to form the vertices of a "computational triangulation" approach. The first two vertices are no surprise: the neurosciences and the cognitive sciences. Building bridges between these two domains is the traditional "grand challenge" of cognitive science of Fig 1B, to bridge the apparent gap between brain and mind. However, the third, comparative, vertex traditionally plays a minor role in cognitive science. But to fully leverage the importance of algorithmic and implementational insights in constraining cognitive theories, species differences in cognition need to be identified and understood. I suggest that modern biology should play a central role this overall bridge-building enterprise, not least because of the impressive progress in comparative neuroscience and animal cognition made in the last few decades.
Another important point is suggested in Fig 1B, illustrating an issue that should play a more central role in formalizing cognition: the concept of tree-based computation. Where ever one looks in the cognitive sciences, from the actual structure of single neurons right up to the most complex abstract structures of linguistics, key data structures or computational elements have a tree-shaped form. I suggest that this is not accidental, but rather reflects several computational virtues of tree-based computation (at both algorithmic and data structure levels) that are well-known to computer scientists, and have been independently "discovered" by natural selection. Some branches of cognitive science, like linguistics, take the centrality of trees and hierarchical structure for granted, and the tree-like structure of neurons is simply a fact of neuroscience, but in many branches of cognitive science, the conceptual importance of trees remains a topic of debate (e.g. in cognitive musicology cf. (Koelsch et al., 2013) ). But there is considerable evidence (cf. Lashley, 1951; Martin, 1972; Houghton and Hartley, 1995; Rosenbaum et al., 2007) that trees are implicit in many other aspects of (human) psychology, including motor planning, categorization, working memory (via "chunking") and perception (via the "local/global" distinction). Explicitly recognizing and formalizing this aspect of cognition will enable deeper connections to be discovered between these domains.
Finally, I argue that progress in cognitive biology will require us to discard certain intuitive oppositions that still play dominating (and I think destructive) roles in contemporary debates. Most prominently, the dichotomy between associationist versus cognitive models (or "statistics versus rules"), along with the "learned" versus "innate" dichotomy, are prescientific intuitive oppositions that are ill-defined, and thus ultimately untestable, and pernicious to empirical inquiry. I will argue that they need to be replaced with testable, formalized hypotheses drawn from a theory of biological computation, which can provide an over-arching framework within which both individual learning and biologically-constrained species differences play important roles, and within which the associationist/cognitive dichotomy simply dissolves away. Thriving key components of such a formal framework already exist in computational neuroscience, mathematical psychology, in what I will call "predictive systems theory", and are highlighted below.
The Current Role of Formalization in the Cognitive Sciences
The current formalization situation in the cognitive sciences today is quite different from that in physics or chemistry. Core folk-psychological concepts remain central (memory, learning, mental representations, categories…) . These are typically defined heuristically or introspectively, and research proceeds by breaking them down into sub-concepts (e.g. working, declarative, procedural and episodic memory) which are treated as primitives. Theories are often defined visually by connecting these primitive boxes together in diagrams representing the flow of information and control. Mainstream cognitive neuroscience often attempts to map such presumed primitives onto brain circuitry at a macroscopic level (e.g. highlighting the role of the hippocampus in memory formation or the basal ganglia in procedural memory), without explicit formalization of either side of this mapping. This approach is sometimes derided as "boxology" (Blumstein, 1979) or "neo-phrenology" (Friston, 2002) , because it lacks the formal mathematical foundations of cell-level computational neuroscience or mathematical psychology. Nonetheless, a very considerable amount of empirical knowledge and understanding has accumulated in the context of such macro-level cognitive concepts like working memory or exemplar-based categorization, and it seems clear that any successful formal theory of cognition must be compatible with the constraints flowing from these cognitive data.
Of course, most cognitive scientists agree on the desirability of a body of formalized theory capable of linking well-understood properties of individual neurons to computational properties of neural circuits, and from there to existing cognitive models. Cognitive biologists would add that this enterprise needs to include explanations of why species differ, while acknowledging the many cognitive and computational similarities among species. But there are many links missing at present from a biologically-grounded theory of cognition and, despite pockets of formalization, bridging theories between well-formalized models remain rare (with some exceptions described below).
The Role of Computer Science in the Bridging Enterprise
One important exception to this broad generalization about the cognitive sciences comes from computer science and the theory of computation. Early pioneers like Turing, Church and Post devised very different intuitive models of computation, and formalized them in very different ways, but by 1936 it became clear that these are all formally equivalent in the sense that they can represent precisely the same class of possible computations (Davis, 1958; Tomalin, 2002) . These different intuitive approaches are thus all equally valid. For historical reasons the Turing machine has become the placeholder for all of these models, although each formal approach is recognized as useful in different domains (e.g. Church's lambda calculus in semantics, or Post's rewrite systems in computational linguistics). Practically, computer scientists recognize that most existing programming languages are Turing equivalent. Thus, the choice between them is a matter of taste and practicality rather than objective superiority: one's choice of Python over C++ or Java is considered a topic for barroom banter rather than pitched battles or scholarly debate. Much of the work in contemporary computer science involves distinguishing between hard and easy problems, devising algorithms that efficiently solve them, or showing why particular approaches do not scale successfully. Practical considerations play a central role, but not to the exclusion of theoretical rigor. Based on this, I suggest that computer science, and the theory of computation more generally, represents an important pocket of scientific maturity relative to the other cognitive sciences.
1.4 What about the Autonomy of Cognition from (Neural) Implementation? Some cautious cognitive scientists or philosophers might find it naïve or even hubristic to attempt formalization and "neural reduction" of cognition, given our current incomplete understanding. Why formalize, one might ask, before we even have a clear intuitive idea about what the relevant entities in our theories might be? Furthermore, following Marr's classic division of vision into computational, algorithmic, and implementational components (Marr, 1982) , many cognitive scientists argue for autonomy of the computational component from the messy details of implementation in the brain: the "autonomy thesis" (Fodor, 1974; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988) . From this widely-accepted viewpoint, bridging neuroscience and cognitive science is not just premature, but fundamentally wrong-headed.
I believe that such caution is unwarranted and that the autonomy thesis has outlived its usefulness. Regarding premature formalization, the history of science provides abundant evidence that science progresses faster when embracing crisp, clear models, even incorrect ones, than by accepting insightful but fuzzy metaphors that include partial truths, but are resistant to disproof. The very attempt to formalize can reveal blind spots or inconsistencies, and clarify the crucial choice points at which some aspects of a complex problem are foregrounded and others abstracted away. Furthermore, explicit formalization and contrasting of multiple plausible models provides a source of new experimental paradigms, and thus generates new experimental data. As George Box memorably put it "all models are wrong, but some are useful", and contrasting the predictions of multiple models is the surest way to gain insight into which are usefully wrong (Box and Draper, 1987) . In contrast, nonformal models often encourage a confirmational approach, in which a favored model is contrasted with some implausible null hypothesis, and minor discrepancies between theory and experiment lead to tweaking or elaboration of the existing model. Empirically, this often leads to ever-finer modifications of existing experimental paradigms, rather than inspiring new paradigms that generate potentially disconfirming data (Wolfe, 1998) . I argue that we are better off formalizing, and failing, than not formalizing at all.
Regarding neuroscience and the "autonomy thesis" the traditional notion that we can study cognition with little or no attention to its mechanistic, neural basis is misleading, both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, the thesis is often justified by characterizing cognition as a Turing machine, capable of any possible computation, and observing correctly that there are many ways to build such a machine (including, apparently, both silicon transistors and carbon-based cells). But human language, the capacity that has best been characterized at a computational level, is far from a Turing-complete system. Computational linguists currently agree that generating the full string set of any human language requires weakly context sensitive grammars, and no more (Stabler, 2004) , and we have no good reason to believe that vision, music or motor control require more than this. Such systems can be implemented in computational systems vastly less powerful than Turing machines. Practically, in models of computation below the Turing limit, factors such as implementation and real-time computation become central, and must be rigorously characterized.
Furthermore, the autonomy thesis stems from a time when computational neuroscience remained immature, and placed few important restrictions on cognitive models (Fodor, 1974) . But a central message of the current review is that times have changed, and modern neuroscience now offers a very rich body of data and models, ripe for unification with more traditional cognitive frameworks. Unlike the founders of cognitive science 50 years ago, we are lucky to have both considerable understanding of neuronal physiology to constrain theorizing, and the powerful tools of modern computers at our disposal to crunch data and simulate models. It thus does not seem premature to attempt to create a comprehensive formal framework for cognitive science, including complex domains like language and music.
Given the central role that language and complex cognition played in the history of cognitive science (Gardner, 1985; Miller, 2003) , it is somewhat ironic that today, the most successful bridge between neuroscience and psychology is that between classical associative learning theory and neural predictive coding (e.g. in the midbrain dopaminergic system; see below). Classic "cognitive" topics like language or problem solving are less clearly formalized, and formal models that make testable predictions at the neuronal level remain rare. Perhaps this is not surprising given the traditional acceptance of the autonomy thesis by many cognitive scientists, and the daunting complexity of language. Unfortunately, being based largely on invasive studies in animal "models", associative learning theory has had little place for species differences as a relevant aspect of the research programme. But if we hope to understand the fundamental differences between species, including those differentiating humans from other animals, we need a framework that allows us to conceptualize and understand such differences, with language as a key example.
Toward a Computational Framework for Comparative Cognition
Here I will proceed by identifying some relatively uncontroversial well-formalized principles of neural computation, and then providing suggestions for how these can be linked to classic cognitive metaphors via the higher-level abstractions of the theory of computation. I will rather ambitiously choose the cognitive domains of human language and music as the highlevel cognitive domains to be explained, because linguistics and musicology provide us with relatively clear formalized models, in comparison many other aspects of cognition (Jackendoff, 2002; Pulvermüller, 2010; Koelsch, 2012) .
The goal is to build bridging theories between cell-level computation (a concept which is itself rather new), computational principles of multi-cell circuits, and the high-level concepts of cognitive science (perception, memory, learning, categorization, language, music) . Although I will make use of David Marr's three-way split between explanatory levels, I will extend Marr's vision-based framework in three ways. First, as recently advocated by (Poggio, 2012) , I will include comparative (evolutionary) issues as a central component of cognitive science (this is the "cognitive biology" aspect of the framework). Second, I will not align Marr's levels with disciplines (e.g. "neuroscience = implementation" or "cognition = computation"), but rather argue for applying all three levels within each discipline, suggesting that a computational account at the neural level is a necessity for understanding implementational issues at the cognitive level. Third, taking my lead from contemporary work in computational linguistics and the theory of algorithms, I will highlight the importance of trees as a basic data structure for understanding cognition, at least in humans. The framing of a wide variety of computational problems in terms of trees (e.g., binary search trees, decision trees, suffix trees, spanning trees, etc) and the existence of efficient tree-processing algorithms to solve such problems is well known to computer scientists (Skiena, 1998; Pemmaraju and Skiena, 2003) . But the scope and power of tree-based computing remains less widely appreciated in the cognitive sciences, where sequences, matrices, and arbitrary graphs receive much more intensive attention.
At the implementational level, any biologically-grounded theory of cognition will need to accept important differences between neural wetware and contemporary computer hardware. Neurons are living cells -complex self-modifying arrangements of living matterwhile silicon transistors are etched and fixed. This means that applying the "software/hardware" distinction to the nervous system is misleading. The fact that neurons change their form, and that such change is at the heart of learning and plasticity, makes the term "neural hardware" particularly inappropriate. The mind is not a program running on the hardware of the brain. The mind is constituted by the ever-changing living tissue of the brain, made up of a class of complex cells, each one different in ways that matter, and that are specialized to process information.
At the algorithmic level, it is now a commonplace that many of the cognitive problems successfully dealt with by organisms every day are, technically, computationally intractable: long is the list of NP-hard computational problems that organisms solve without obvious effort or delay (Rolls and Deco, 2001; Trappenberg, 2002) . The reason, of course, is that organisms make do with heuristic solutions, crafted by millions of years of evolution, that are "probably approximately correct", and which evade the worst-case scenarios that are the bane of computer algorithm designers (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Kahneman, 2011; Valiant, 2013) . Given that organisms must make use of such rough-and-ready algorithms, and that a body of theory exists to understand them, it would be perverse for cognitive scientists to ignore this important source of algorithmic constraints on computation-level theories.
At the computational level, many important insights of the connectionist era, particularly the core insights that neural computation is parallel and distributed, must be carried over into the future. But rather than seeing these insights in opposition to traditional "computational" approaches based on symbol processing, rules and representations, it seems increasingly clear that each of these approaches offers valuable insights, and they represent complementary rather than conflicting levels of explanation. I will suggest below that several computational insights from connectionist "neural network" models, especially the role of error in learning, in fact provide a better fit at the cellular level of computation than at the system level. The framework advanced below thus implies a redeployment of these insights down to the level of single-neuron computation.
Outline of What Follows
In the rest of this paper, I will attempt to flesh out the proposed interdisciplinary framework sketched above. I start by pinpointing several traditional folk-psychological distinctions that have long framed debate in cognitive science, but are unhelpful because they really concern issues of emphasis, or focus on different levels of the theoretical framework, rather than reflecting clashing world views about how neural computation and cognition work (Section 2). These unhelpful but pervasive dichotomies include the long-running debate between nature versus nurture, and between connectionist/associationist approaches and "classical" cognitive models based on rules, representations, and programming analogies.
In sections 3-6, I turn to the main (positive) messages of the paper. Section 3 argues that cognitive scientists need to take seriously the biological wetware within which cognitive computations are performed, especially the fact that individual cells are the basic computational unit, themselves constituting complex computing devices. This is a fact of modern neuroscience: neurons themselves do computation that cannot be captured as a simple "integrate and fire" node in a "neural" network. This fact implies that neither connectionist networks nor classical cognitive models are searching for the bridges to computational neuroscience in the right places. Section 4 emphasizes a view of brains as predictive systems, rather than representational engines, and of the importance of this viewpoint in constraining our models of the algorithms we use to accomplish difficult tasks. Again the theory of computation, particularly algorithmic and coding efficiency, holds important lessons. Section 5 highlights the need to characterize species differences computationally. I suggest that at least for higher human cognitive abilities like language and music, the ability to infer hierarchical (tree-based) structures is critical. The theory of computation provides an explicit framework within which to characterize this capacity, and to probe the differing computational abilities of multiple species. Existing data collected within this framework suggests that representing explicit hierarchical structures is difficult, or impossible, for many nonhuman species. This appears to represent a qualitative difference among species, or at least a substantial quantitative difference with qualitative consequences for cognition.
In the 7 th and final section, I will offer a more speculative account of the importance of treebased computational approaches to cognition in understanding species differences and how they may be implemented in neural wetware. In the hope of mapping out some parts of the terrain that needs to be covered, I offer some speculative but testable hypotheses to spur research. My goal here is to exemplify, rather than to exhaustively catalog: I do not mean to imply that the framework presented is limited to the domains discussed.
Initial Diagnosis and Proposed Remedy: Using Formal Models to Move Beyond Intuitive Distinctions
I first hope to diagnose what I see as a central problem in much contemporary cognitive research: an over-reliance on conceptual dichotomies that represent intuitive, ill-defined viewpoints, rather than well-specified models or frameworks. My target dichotomies are "innate knowledge" versus "learning", on the one hand, and "associationist" versus "cognitive" models on the other. Neither of these distinctions are well-defined, and I will argue that both dichotomies have proven ultimately pernicious. Once we formalize the problems (e.g. using some variant of a Bayesian framework) it becomes clear that debates employing these traditional dichotomies foreground irrelevant and ultimately philosophical issues, while downplaying or ignoring the empirical issues of central relevance.
Throughout this essay, I will explore examples in which well-formalized and successful models reveal such traditional intuitive distinctions to be misleading. For example the recent successful bridging of formal learning theory (e.g. the Rescorla-Wagner rule) and midbrain dopaminergic reward prediction systems has revealed that no distinction is made at the neural level between "model-free" (Pavlovian) learning and "model-based" (cognitive) learning. Similarly, a Bayesian framework provides a natural home encompassing traditional probabilistic learning approaches, rule-based symbolic computation, and innate species differences (implemented as reliably-developing prior probability distributions), dissolving dichotomies that seem intuitively obvious from a folk-psychological viewpoint.
"Learned versus Innate Knowledge"
The so-called nature/nurture debate is one of the longest-running, and least productive, disputes in all of academic discourse. What makes its longevity remarkable is that virtually all informed commentators on the dichotomy agree that it is misleading and pernicious, representing what Patrick Bateson memorably dubbed "the corpse of a wearisome debate" (Bateson, 2002) . Yet the nature/nurture opposition continues to spark strong feelings and polarize cognitive scientists (e.g., Bates and Elman, 1996; Pinker, 2002) .
There is no dearth of detailed analysis of this "nature versus nurture" scourge, from both philosophical (Ariew, 1999; Griffiths, 2002) and biological (Lorenz, 1965; Bateson and Mameli, 2007) perspectives. There is a clear consensus that the term "innate" acts as a cover term for multiple distinct biological properties that, although typically conflated in folk psychology, need to be considered separately in modern science. For example, "innate" often connotes species-or domain-specificity to cognitive scientists. But many innate propensities (such as the satiating value of food for hungry individuals) are broadly shared by most animal species. Similarly, many "classical" computational mechanisms underlying vision (binocular disparity processing, shape from shading, etc) are presumably both genetically-canalized and domainspecific, but are nonetheless shared among many mammals. Innately-determined learning mechanisms, such as classical conditioning, are presumably both species-and domaingeneral. So "innate" does not necessarily mean "species specific" or "domain specific", and there is no justification for the unfortunate tendency to conflate genetic determination, species-specificity, and domain-specificity all together, or to misuse the term "innate" to refer to all of them (Fitch, 2011b ).
An additional conceptual problem concerns innate learning mechanisms. To many psychologists, "innate" connotes that NO learning takes place, a precept psychologists often accept either implicitly (e.g., Reber, 1996) or explicitly (e.g., Samuels, 2004) . By accepting this disjunction, psychologists miss out on a clear and biologically-grounded escape path out of the nature/nurture quandary: the recognition of the existence and importance of "instincts to learn" (Marler, 1991; Fitch, 2011c) in understanding both learning and instinct. No biologist studying hunger would deny that animals learn about different foods, and no psychologist would deny that feeding, hunger and digestion all have strong and reliably-developing inborn components. Most aspects of cognition involve "instincts to learn" -bundles of proclivities, biases and constraints that lead the organism to attend to particular aspects of situations, biasing them to form certain types of generalizations and not others (Breland and Breland, 1961; Garcia and Koelling, 1966) . The claim that human language or music have an innate component thus does not imply the (obviously fallacious) claim that no learning is involved in these domains. Because this issue has already been so thoroughly diagnosed, and antidotes suggested, I will not belabor these points further (cf. Ariew, 1999; Griffiths, 2002) : cognition in humans and other animals is grounded in "instincts to learn," and to ask if a mature capacity is "innate" or "learned" is to immediately go astray in understanding it scientifically.
The Bayesian Path Beyond Nature/Nurture
The nature/nurture dichotomy provides my first illustration of the value of a formal approach, in this case of a Bayesian perspective, for moving beyond outworn intuitive metaphors. The Bayesian approach provides a formal mathematical framework within which organisms can update the parameters of internal models ( ), based on data (D). In particular, Bayes' Theorem shows that: which, if the data are already in hand reduces to the more compact and insightful form:
This says that our estimate of the probability of a model, given some data, is proportional to the product of the probability of this particular data, given the model p(D| ), and our "prior" estimate of that model's probability, p( ). Although this is a simple mathematical truth (a theorem), and the significance and power of this rule is widely appreciated among computer scientists or learning theorists, it is less common in classical rule-and-representation approaches to cognitive science. Indeed, such probabilistic, learning-based approaches are sometimes actively contrasted with symbolic approaches (Bates and Elman, 1996; Pinker, 1999; Seidenberg and Elman, 1999) . This is a shame, because the Bayesian formalism provides a natural home for both learning (data) and innate constraints on learning, via priors, (Chater and Manning, 2006) . I begin by observing that the folk psychological term "knowledge" can be formalized in terms of Bayesian priors on some probability distribution. Nativists and learning theorists will both agree that the response of an organism to a stimulus or a situation is influenced strongly by its (unconscious) estimation of the probabilities that different actions will lead to successful or unsuccessful outcomes (rewards or punishments). These probabilities can be represented and quantified as prior probabilities for those actions. This makes a central question "where do such priors come from?". Some may be intuitively categorized as innate (for example, a newborn mammals' suckling response is a highly-canalized reaction, present at birth) and some may intuitively appear learned (as for Pavlov's dogs' salivating to a bell). But in both cases a biological substrate exists which provides the necessary prerequisites for learning.
In many cases the "learning" has been done on a phylogenetic time scale (through evolution): this is the province of reliably-developing "instincts", traditionally studied in classical ethology. In others cases a biologically-provided learning mechanism (such as classical conditioning) enables the organism to generate new priors in its own lifetime (the classical province of learning theorists). Even in the learning of wholly arbitrary stimulus/response associations, the computational mechanisms allowing the organism to compute statistics over stimuli, actions and consequences, along with appropriate recognition of "rewards" and "punishments," must be innate. And despite the appealing behaviorist dream that these evolutionary priors would turn out to reflect species-general "laws of learning", it has long been clear that species vary considerably in both what, and how well, they learn. Learning abilities vary across species (Breland and Breland, 1961; Lorenz, 1965) , and individual organisms are biologically biased to form certain classes of associations and not others (Garcia and Koelling, 1966; Shettleworth, 1972) .
Notably, when formulated in probabilistic terms we can ask "what prior probabilities influence an organisms cognition and behavior in a particular circumstance", fully expecting the list of priors to include a mix of evolutionarily-acquired biases and others acquired by the individual organism over its ontogeny. This mix will vary for different types of knowledge and actions, and over the individuals' lifespan. A baby does not "learn" to cry when hungry, or to laugh when tickled, but the child does learn that crying may influence caregiver behavior, just as the adult learns that crying or laughing are inappropriate in certain situations. There is no need to categorize either behavior as either innate or learned, as it will always be both, and indeed the answer will depend on the individual's age, experience and culture. Nor will insight come from treating this as a simple one-dimensional continuum, where traits are, for example, "60% learned and 40% innate": the probability space has many more dimensions than this simple continuum can encompass, and requires a much more nuanced and fine-grained analysis.
An important virtue of the Bayesian probabilistic approach to cognition is that it is, in an important sense, "substrate neutral". That is, after meeting certain minimal conditions about independence, statistical approaches can be applied to, and probability distributions derived for, any definable type of entity or model. But the types of entities "visible" for probabilistic inference will vary from species to species. We obviously do not expect a color-blind organism to estimate probability distributions over colors, despite being fully equipped with perfect memory and a Bayesian inference engine. Central issues then become "what classes of stimuli can be recognized and counted?" and "what effects are rewarding?" About these biological questions, which are logically prior to probability estimation or application of Bayes' rule, the statistical framework remains initially silent: the answers must come from the history of that individual and the biology of its species.
Nature via Nurture in Language: The Bayesian Perspective
A nice illustration of the value of both rules and statistics comes from computational linguistics, where a probabilistic approach over word-or letter-strings held sway for many years (Rosenfeld, 2000) . Applied to syntax, the probabilistic approach started by assuming that each word in a sentence predicts its immediate successor with some probability (represented by a two-word "bigram"). By calculating probability distributions over bigrams, sequentially, we can both generate sentences (Shannon, 1948; , and predict the probability of observed sentences. As Shannon noted, this approach fails for a relatively obvious reason: sometimes words are related to more distant words than their nearest neighbor. For example, in "the cat who scratched the dog ran away", we know that it was the cat who ran away, despite the presence in this word string of "the dog ran away". While we might attempt to get around this by using larger strings (n-grams, where trigrams are the most common), this will not solve the problem fully. Long-distance dependencies present a major problem for n-gram approaches both because there is no fixed distance between related words (so no given n will necessarily work), and because there is a massive combinatorial explosion of possible n-grams as n increases. Even for trigrams, the amount of data required to calculate the probabilities is vast, and even after processing a 38-million-word corpus, many specific trigrams, known to be valid, remain unattested (Rosenfeld, 2000) .
Most contemporary approaches take a quite different approach, and attempt to estimate syntactic structures rather than word strings (Pereira, 2000; Rosenfeld, 2000; Johnson and Riezler, 2002; Chater and Manning, 2006; Perfors et al., 2011) . The problem remains statistical, but now the task is to estimate a tree structure S given a word string D (that is, P(S|D)). The capacity to generate a set of possible tree-structures (via a context-free grammar) is thus at the heart of probabilistic computational linguistics (Johnson and Riezler, 2002; Johnson, 2008; Perfors et al., 2011) . But, just as a color-blind organism cannot do statistics over color, a Bayesian organism that happens to be incapable of perceiving or remembering tree structures cannot even begin to solve this problem. Considerable data suggests that many non-human organisms may be limited in precisely this way (see below). Thus the core issue is not whether an organism can learn statistical associations, or uses probability estimates to do so, but rather concerns what types of objects or stimuli it can process. From this perspective, a probabilistic Bayesian approach to language, and child language acquisition in particular, is compatible with the full spectrum of cognitive approaches, from nativist, generative approaches (Johnson, 2013) to those that place domain-general learning systems at center stage (Chater and Manning, 2006) . Put in these terms, the questions become empirical, and include what types of models a particular organism is capable of generating, and to what degree its initial prior distribution over these models is uniform versus biased in one way or another.
While computational linguists already largely embrace this dichotomy-denying framework, both theoretical linguists and psycholinguists have been slow to follow, with some notable and important exceptions (e.g., Perfors et al., 2010; Perfors et al., 2011) . Cognitive (neuro)science, in general, lags even further behind. Thus, the re-marriage of rules and statistics, and nature via nurture, is a revolution ready to occur.
"Cognitive" versus "Associationist" Interpretations of Learning
The second long-running dichotomy I will criticize is particularly problematic in the animal cognition literature: a rigid distinction between "cognitive" and "associationist" explanations. "Associationist" explanations focus on stimulus-driven behavior, unconscious knowledge, and typically learning mechanisms thought to exist a wide range of species (e.g. classical conditioning and associative learning). In contrast, "cognitive" explanations typically connote covert mental activity (going beyond perceptual stimuli and behavioral responses), as well as flexible context-dependence, goal-directed model-building, and often consciousness. Again, this basic dichotomy has deep roots (going back to the arguments between rationalist and empiricist philosophers) and continues to play a prominent role in contemporary cognitive science. As for the nature/nurture debate, the fact that this debate has remained unresolved for so long suggests that the central questions are not directly subject to empirical test or refutation. But again, a clear and empirically successful body of formal theory exists which incorporates and subsumes the crucial elements of both perspectives: what I dub "predictive systems theory" (see below). This research field provides a beautiful illustration of the power of formalization to dissolve and defuse the intuitive folk-psychological distinction between "cognitive" and "associative" perspectives.
2.5 Beyond the Cognitive/Associationist Debate with Predictive Approaches I will highlight current work conceptualizing the dopaminergic reward system as a modelbased predictive code, consistent with traditional Rescorla-Wagner learning theory (Schultz, 2002) . Classical behaviorism eschewed all mentalistic "covert" variables in the analysis of behavior, and sought general laws of stimulus/response learning that would apply to all organisms and all stimuli. However, serious problems with these goals became evident, within the associative tradition, from demonstrations that certain types of associations can be learned much more easily than others. For example, a rat easily learns to associate a taste with later nausea, or a light flash with electric shock, but despite repeated pairings, does not learn to associate a light with nausea, or a taste with shock (Garcia and Koelling, 1966) . While these biases make sense from an evolutionary viewpoint, they presented a serious challenge to the notion of general, domain-independent "laws" of learning. An even more worrisome issue was presented by the phenomenon of "blocking" (Rescorla, 1988) , where a previouslylearned association (e.g. between a light and reward) "blocks" the acquisition of an equallyinformative second association (e.g. between a sound and that same reward).
These and related phenomena led to a renaissance in learning theory in the 1970's, in which associative learning came to be seen in terms of prediction of rewards, rather than of simple stimulus-response linkages. While learning theorists still tended to characterize their views in associationist terms (e.g., Rescorla, 1988) it is important to recognize that in incorporating the organism's predictions about rewards, the theory took a very big step in a cognitive direction. For where do predictions come from? Clearly, from some internal model used by the organism to make predictions based on context and stimuli. Although not typically acknowledged, this clearly requires some form of (perhaps unconscious) "mental" model, requiring learning theorists to "belatedly embrace the cognitive revolution" (Daw and Frank, 2009 ).
Again, a formal characterization helps to make the issues more explicit. Take the classic Rescorla-Wagner learning rule, probably the most successful and influential formal model in mathematical psychology:
where V is the change in associative strength, lambda is the highest associative strength possible for the current reward, and V x is the current predicted associative strength. Beta is a fixed parameter determining learning speed, and alpha x is another rate parameter which indicates the "salience" of x to the organism in question. This equation can be expanded to compound cues x 1 , x 2 , x n by stipulating that the total V is the sum of all V x s.
The Rescorla-Wagner model is essentially just a simple error-minimizing, model-fitting system, in which prediction accuracy is improved by continually evaluating the deviation between prediction and reality (the "prediction error"). The strength of the updating process is directly correlated with the "suprisingness" of the result (Rescorla, 1988; Schultz, 2013) . The equation incorporates species-specificity via the two rate parameters, alpha and beta, where alpha indicates the salience of a particular sensory signal to the species and beta indicates an overall "general" learning speed. The reward value incorporated within the lambda term could also be species-specific (ants are rewarding to anteaters, as is clover to cows -but not vice versa).
More importantly, the Rescorla-Wagner model covertly entails a cognitive mechanism capable of generating the predicted outcome V x , without which it would be impossible to calculate prediction error. Rescorla himself called the mechanism responsible for this a "representation" (Rescorla, 1988) , though today it is typically couched in terms of a prediction based on a "model" (Schultz, 2013) . Whatever we call this process, it is clearly cognitive in the sense of being based on a covert internal model, which is the key component that changes during learning. That is, although initially the prediction error will simply be directly proportional to the strength of the reward (lambda) because no prediction is made (V x = 0), learning entails updating the system to the point where V x = lambda, at which point there is no remaining prediction error. Based only on this equation and the behavioral data, we might continue to debate just how "cognitive" such predictions are.
Fortunately, the prediction-based approach embodied in the Rescorla-Wagner equation has driven major empirical progress in understanding associative learning in neural terms (Schultz and Dickinson 2000; Schultz, 2002; , and leaves little doubt that the predictions driving associative learning are indeed cognitive (or as Schultz puts it "model-based"). For example, the firing rate of dopamine neurons in the mammalian midbrain appears to directly encode the prediction error term (lambda -V) from the Rescorla-Wagner model. But, crucially, the prediction error encoded by these neurons is based on subjective predictions rather than objective ones when the two conflict. For example, dopaminergic neurons react to the subjective reward value (discounted for time), rather than the raw amount of food, and encode subjective presence or absence of stimuli (rather than their actual physical presence or absence) when this is ambiguous.
This modern neurally-grounded interpretation of classical conditioning has come a long way from the reflexive analogy favored by Pavlov, or the orientation to the physical stimulus typical of behaviorists, moving in a clearly 'cognitive' direction (Rescorla, 1988) . Nonetheless most contemporary learning theorists (or neuroscientists) would continue to characterize this process as "associative" and eschew cognitive, mentalistic terms in their own research. Furthermore, in the animal cognition literature, such "associative" explanations continue to be seen as alternatives to "cognitive" explanations, and often are considered to be a priori simpler and more parsimonious (cf. Heyes, 1998; Byrne and Bates, 2006; Buckner, 2011) .
This seems to me a clear case where careful, formalized models have fueled scientific progress and can help to build the needed bridges between psychology and neuroscience, and between theory and experiment. Observe that no victory has been declared in the longrunning battle between cognition and association: instead, this traditional dichotomy is simply dissolving away and has lost much of its former significance (cf. Rescorla, 1988; Daw and Frank, 2009; Schultz, 2013) . Scientists working at this interface (e.g., Schultz and Dickinson 2000) do not appear overly concerned about whether their models are bestcharacterized as "cognitive" or "associationist". Instead, they admirably focus on how well their models fit empirical data, and more importantly, generate testable predictions. The key point is that clear formalization of hypotheses and their predictions, combined with empirical investigation at the neural level, can lead to a dissolution of intuitive but fuzzy dichotomies. Again, the advance is being led by computationally-minded neuroscientists, and fields like cognitive psychology and animal cognition have some catching up to do.
The two examples above illustrate the promise of a formally grounded empirical approach to span the current gaps between the fields of cognition, neuroscience, and computation. With this critique behind us, I now turn to the more positive aspect of the paper. My goal is to map out a computational framework bridging theories between cellular neuroscience at the low end to computational perspectives on music and language at the high end.
Single-Neuron Computing: Bridging Cognitive Theory and Neuro-Computational Reality
The first important component of my framework concerns the computational power of single neurons (cf. Koch, 1997; Koch and Segev, 2000; London and Häusser, 2005; Herz et al., 2006) . It is a central insight of contemporary computational neuroscience, for at least the last decade, that traditional models of neural computation (from McCulloch-Pitts to recurrent connectionist networks) vastly underestimate the computational power of single neurons: It now appears that a single cortical pyramidal cell has roughly the power of a classical twolayer neural network (Herz et al., 2006) . The central importance of this fact is that it inserts a heretofore neglected level of biological agency -that of the single cell -as a key locus of learning and adaptation in computational models. Previously, learning from errors was modeled (probably unrealistically) as a process at the network-level, but we now know that error-based learning can take place in an individual cell, via essentially Hebbian processes like spike-timing dependent plasticity (London and Häusser, 2005; Larkum et al., 2009) . This re-estimation of neuronal computational powers also has some interesting implication for evolution, inserting the biology of living cells back into both computational modelling and philosophical debates about intentionality and consciousness (cf. Fitch, 2008) . But more importantly for the current argument, these neural facts necessitate a redeployment of some of the insights from nearly thirty years of work in connectionism (Rummelhart and McClelland, 1986 ) from the network down to the cell level.
The Tradition: "Consider a Spherical Neuron…"
There is an old joke about a theoretical physicist asked to help re-design a dairy farm who, after weeks of deep thought, begins his presentation with "Consider a spherical cow…" The joke is funny because it emphasizes the tendency of physicists to simplify a problem (often for ease of calculation) in ways that seem unrealistic, non-intuitive, or impractical. Perhaps less humorous is the fact that this has been precisely the standard approach to modeling neuronal function for roughly 50 years, starting with the very foundations of computational neuroscience (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943) . This "spherical neuron" tradition exists despite the fact that the actual shape of most neurons is complex and treelike (see Fig. 2 ) --about as far from spherical as geometrically possible. Traditionally, this difference between model and reality was seen as superficial and inconsequential, at least from a computational viewpoint. But in the last decade or so it has become clear that this is incorrect at a fundamental level. Nonetheless, even today, the vast majority of research in computational neuroscience and connectionist models involves networks of simple "spherical neurons" which simply sum and threshold their inputs (cf. Koch, 1998; Koch and Segev, 2000; Silver, 2010) .
The traditional computational approach to the nervous system was first made rigorous by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts in a seminal paper demonstrating that one can translate any proposition couched in logical terms into specific binary networks of rather simple "units", proposed to be essentially equivalent to neurons (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943) . These "neurons" simply sum all of their positive inputs (linearly) and apply a (nonlinear) threshold function; if the summed "activation" is above the threshold the unit "fires" (generates a 1 instead of a 0). In the "classic" McCulloch/Pitts neuron, there were also inhibitory neurons, and if one or more impinging inhibitory neurons was active, the cell would not fire. The computationally crucial aspect of these units is that each implemented a nonlinear thresholding operation, which converts its essentially analog (real-valued) inputs into a discrete (binary of "logical") output. But all of the computational power in a McCulloch-Pitts system comes from the arrangement of these very simple units into networks. An aspect of this idealization, known to be oversimplified even at that time, was that a cell's current state depended on only its current inputs, and not its own previous state. This ignored the fact that, after a neuron fires, it goes through an intrinsic refractory period during which it cannot fire (or firing probability is reduced).
The demonstration of the computational power of networks had an immense effect on neuroscience because it rendered plausible the idea that biological neural circuits could be characterized in rigorous computational terms, and showed that the computations permitted were extremely powerful (cf. Minsky, 1967) . McCulloch and Pitts themselves claimed that their computational characterization was compatible with many different neurophysiological implementations, a claim that appeared to warrant abstracting away from cell-level details when investigating neural computation. Rightly or wrongly, this became a founding assumptions of cognitive neuroscience, and ever since seemed to justify separating "cognition" from "cellular neurophysiology" (often misleadingly glossed as "software versus hardware"). Thus, after a cursory treatment of single-cell physiology, current cognitive neuroscience textbooks focus almost entirely on macroscopic neural circuitry, cortical regions or whole-brain function (Gazzaniga et al., 1998) .
Despite its over-simplifications, the McCulloch-Pitts "neuron" became, and remains, a basic staple of computational neuroscience. This is particularly marked in the broad resurgence of connectionist networks (a.k.a. "neural networks" or "parallel-distributed processing" models) starting in the late 1980's and continuing today. By overcoming some computational limitations of earlier neurally-inspired models like Rosenblatt's Perceptron model (Minsky and Papert, 1969) , connectionists led a resurgence of "rule-free" associative models of the mind in cognitive science (Rummelhart and McClelland, 1986; Rescorla, 1988; Elman et al., 1997) . Although many of the tricks used in connectionist models are biologically unrealistic (e.g. backpropagation of error or "context units" in recurrent networks), these systems are provably very powerful (Síma and Orponen, 2003) , and have been used to successfully model various aspects of high-level computation including music and language (Bharucha, 1987; Elman et al., 1997; Christiansen and Chater, 1999) . However, research in the last decades has quite clearly demonstrated that models based on integrate-threshold-fire neurons are woefully inadequate as models of real nervous systems, for a simple and important reason: single neurons are much more powerful than McCulloch-Pitts cells or connectionist "units". These findings demonstrate both that there is nothing neural about "neural networks", and more importantly that cognitive scientists need to pay renewed attention to cellular neuroscience if we hope to understand the biological basis of cognitive computation and bridge the (apparent) mind/brain gap.
The Modern View: Computation and the Single Neuron
It has been obvious since Ramón y Cajal first published his lavish drawings of single neurons (Ramón y Cajal, 1894 2004) that neurons are cells distinguished by their complex threedimensional form, which at least in vertebrates typically closely resembles that of a tree (with axons and dendrites corresponding to leaf-bearing branches and the root system of a botanical tree). It long seemed possible that this cellular morphology simply represented a way of distributing the neuron's mass through a large volume of nervous tissues (e.g. to allow more connections with other neurons). The question of what, if any, computational significance the treelike form of neurons might have has only been conclusively resolved in the last decade (Koch and Segev, 2000) . We now know that, far from being passive summators, the different branches of the dendritic tree themselves act as computational elements (roughly equivalent to the "units" of a connectionist network) (London and Häusser, 2005; Herz et al., 2006) . The presence of active (voltage-dependent) ion channels, as well as short-range interactions within dendritic branches, means that a single biological neuron is roughly equivalent in computational power to a two-layer neural network made up of hundreds of "units". It is now possible to simulate the complex function of a neuron, using principles of cellular electrophysiology that are well-understood at a chemical and physical level (Koch, 1998) , and ongoing advances in imaging and cell-level manipulation now make it possible to empirically observe such computations in living cells, and compare them to models (e.g., Ujfalussy et al., 2009; Gidon and Segev, 2012; Cazé et al., 2013) . There can now be no doubt that the complex, tree-like form of individual neurons plays an important, and indeed central, role in determining the integration and firing behavior of cells, and thus in the computations of the networks they are part of. Furthermore, unlike silicon transistors, each neuron is different in form, in ways that reflect its past history and often matter computationally (cf. Fitch, 2008) .
At first blush this may seem like depressing news for cognitive scientists. As if the nervous system wasn't complex enough, we now need to worry about the complexity of single cells? But on closer consideration this increase in complexity at the local level may in fact enable us to simplify our theories at a more global level. Recognizing that single cells engage in complex computations allows us to incorporate a previously known aspect of biological agency -that of single cells -into our models of computation. Single cells respond to their environment by changing their form and composition, and free-living single-celled organisms can learn about their environment. By recognizing these capacities in neurons, which are after all eukaryotic cells inheriting two billion years worth of evolved adaptability, we can now reconceptualize the level at which certain types of learning (most notably Hebbian processes) take place. Things that made little physiological sense at a network level (e.g. back-propagation of error signals: Rolls and Deco, 2001 ) make perfect biophysical sense in a cellular context, because when a cell fires an action potential, depolarization propagates back through the dendritic tree, providing a local "teaching" signal to each synapse. Furthermore, a host of well-investigated neurophysiological phenomena such as long-term depression or potentiation, mediated by NMDA (n-methyl-d-aspartate) receptors, provide a clear mechanism whereby a cell "learns" the required computations by updating its physical form (cf. Trappenberg, 2002) . Decades worth of computational insights derived from connectionist modeling can thus be redeployed at the cellular, rather than the network, level. The result -I believe -will be a major boost to attempts at bridging the cognitive/neural gap, building on the solid foundations of cellular biophysics and the fast-developing field of cellular computation.
Single-Cell Computing: Further Implications for Cognitive Science
There are several further implications of single-cell computation for cognitive science. The fact that computation at the cellular level occurs in trees (and not arbitrary, or fullyconnected, networks of synapses) should place important constraints on the kinds of elementary computations computable by a single cell, which in turn must influence the types of algorithms that can be efficiently realized in networks of tree-shaped neurons. This, in turn, should "percolate up" to the level of cognitive theories, allowing us to better evaluate which computational models and algorithms are biologically plausible at the implementational level. Thus, although it would be naïve to think that there is any direct connection between the tree form of individual neurons and the many abstract trees that populate the cognitive landscape, it is simply realistic to recognize that such abstract cognitive trees are implemented in computational machinery made up of tree networks. In terms of the "grand challenge" of cognitive neuroscience, explicitly building bridges from mind to brain, I suspect that having trees anchoring both sides of the bridge should help constrain and channel future bridge-building.
A second set of implications of single-neuron computation concerns species differences in cognition. We know that important species differences exist, from the perceptual (bats echolocate, cats don't) to the cognitive (humans acquire language and monkeys don't). Yet, within mammals at least, it seems quite unlikely at this point that any major species differences exist in the types of ion channels, neurotransmitters, neuronal cell types, tissues, or brain regions that make up a bat, monkey, cat or human brain. At none of these levels of neural organization have neuroscientists discovered a "smoking gun," a neural difference that can account, by itself, for high-level cognitive differences. However, there are both theoretical and empirical grounds for expecting species differences at the cognitive level to derive from differences at the level of the form of different (shared) cell types, and the connections between these cells. Theoretically, this supposition is based on the fact that genetically-based differences in neurocomputational abilities are implemented by individual cells, expressing their own personal copy of the genome. There is no "mastermind" in neural development, ordering cells to go here and there. Instead, each individual neuron must find its own way, extend its own axons and dendrites based on its own local environmental cues and interactions with other cells. Thus it seems likely that many important geneticallyguided differences in neural function will be most directly observed at the cellular level.
For example, the way in which perceptuo-motor connections are made in the developing songbird brain (Matsunaga and Okanoya, 2008; ) is now understood as a time-sensitive interaction between cell adhesion molecules called cadherins. Cadherin expression changes in the post-synaptic motor cells of area RA, facilitating the formation of synapses at the appropriate time. This allows pre-synaptic cells, projecting axons from higher-order associative regions, to form crucial auditory-motor connections of the birdsong control circuit. Thus understanding of the implementational architecture of the song system, in genetic and species-specific terms, requires looking at cell-to-cell interactions.
Another nice example of the relevance of cell form comes from recent work comparing FoxP2 gene expression in different species. This gene codes for a transcription factor that turns other genes on and off, and the gene is expressed widely in the nervous system (along with other tissues, such as the lung, where it probably has no cognitive impact). Damage to the FoxP2 gene in humans leads to severe difficulties with the motor control of speech (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1998; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2005) . FoxP2 is not "the language gene", but simply one genetic component of a suite of genetic changes that allow our species, but not chimpanzees, to acquire complex learned vocalizations (Fisher, 2006) . Although FoxP2 is, in general, a highly-conserved gene, humans have a recently-evolved variant that is shared by all normal humans, but differs from the version found in chimpanzees and other primates (Enard et al., 2002; Enard et al., 2009) .
Molecular genetic techniques allow both knock-outs of FoxP2 in mouse models (Fisher and Scharff, 2009 ) and insertion of the human version of the gene into genetically-engineered mice (Enard et al., 2009) . Unsurprisingly, mice expressing the human version of the gene do not suddenly start talking, but they do exhibit a fascinating difference in neuronal structure in a particular population of cells in the basal ganglia. Specifically, medium spiny cells in the striatum exhibit both morphological changes (increased dendrite lengths, and thus presumably increased connectivity and changed integration properties) and physiological changes (increased synaptic plasticity). These specific changes occur in the absence of overall changes in brain size or brain circuitry, and despite the apparent normalcy of these "humanized" mice in a wide range of cognitive tests. The "smoking gun", as far as this particular gene-to-behavior mapping goes, is to be found in the structure and physiology of individual cells, which must somehow "percolate up" to neural circuit and whole brain levels, in ways that remain unclear.
In summary, a long-tradition in computational neuroscience and cognitive science more generally has obscured a basic and important fact: the role of the tree-shaped arbor of individual neurons in neural computation. Although computational neuroscience is moving forward with this new insight (e.g., Gidon and Segev, 2012) , "cognitive" models have not kept up and for the most part perpetuate the myth of the spherical neuron. Embracing single-cell computation will open a productive route for bridge-building between cognitive, computational, and neuroscientific levels of understanding, and renew attention to understanding how species differences are implemented in neural tissue. Given that the information summarized above represents widely-accepted facts of neuroscience, it does not seem premature for cognitive scientists to begin considering tree-based neuronal networks (rather than networks of spherical neurons) as our basic default model of how biological computation is achieved.
Predictive Systems Theory: What do Brains Actually Compute?
I now turn to what I see as the second major advance in contemporary neuroscience with crucial implications for cognitive science: what I will call "predictive systems theory" but which goes by a variety of names including "predictive coding", "pattern theory", "predictive control", and "Bayesian decision theory" (Srinivasan et al., 1982; Bell et al., 2008; Vuust et al., 2009; Mumford and Desolneux, 2010; Franklin and Wolpert, 2011) . This body of theory is relatively well-formalized, solidly grounded in neuroscience, and encompasses a number of classical ideas such as the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule and the concept of efference copies. Like the recognition of single-cell computational power, this body of theory is already recognized as both important and empirically well-grounded in neuroscience, but its implications for cognitive science have yet to be widely appreciated (although see Clark, 2013) . One reason for this slow adoption may be that most of this literature has been couched either in strictly neural terms, or in terms of associative learning theory and not explicitly interpreted in cognitive terms. But as I will show, it would be erroneous to think that predictive principles are in some sense limited to low-level "reflexive" aspects of cognition: prediction-based phenomena are evident throughout the entire cortex, and at all levels of human cognition.
The Predictive Insight
The central notion of predictive systems theory is that organisms care less about representing what is actually out there in the world, than how this reality conflicts with their predictions about what should be there. Put more formally, in terms of the Rescorla-Wagner equation, brains care less about lambda (the data in the world) than about the discrepancy (lambda -V), where V represents our current best prediction.
As an intuitive example consider how the words "tall" and "short" are interpreted. Obviously these words are context dependent in that "tall" means something different for a person than for a building or tree, or even for a man versus a woman. Thus saying "she is a tall woman" connotes that "she is tall, relative to the average woman". In other words, we first take some implicit mean of all (adult female) heights, and then use the difference of an exemplar from this mean to determine our notion of "tall". This is perhaps the simplest form of "normalization", where "relative height = actual height -mean height". To improve this measure somewhat, we might perform a two-parameter (Z-score) normalization, where both mean and standard deviation are taken into account. Then we could also encode "very tall", "very short" or "very very tall," in terms of how many standard deviations an exemplar of a tree, person or building are from the mean. Another familiar two-parameter example of predictive coding is the encoding of residuals from a linear regression model. These are just a few of many intuitive examples of predictive coding, where the difference from the value predicted by some model is encoded, rather than the raw values of data.
One virtue of predictive coding of this sort is efficiency via data compression. In the height example above, it will typically require fewer bits to represent the mean and deviations from it (mean = 170 cm, exemplars are + 2, +5, -3) than to store each exemplar in full (172, 175, 167) . A widespread practical example is "linear predictive coding", or LPC, a technique used to losslessly compress speech signals (Atal and Hanauer, 1971; Markel and Gray, 1976; Ladefoged, 1995) . In LPC, a multi-parametric model of the acoustic signal is first fit to a window of data, and then the residual error from this model is transmitted, along with the model parameters. For the case of human speech, such encoding can lead to major improvements in coding efficiency, with no loss of accuracy, because encoding the error signal typically requires many fewer bits per sample than would the raw data.
Predictive Coding in the Nervous System
Based both on such computational considerations, and neuroscientific evidence, it has long been suspected that the nervous system might rely on predictive coding, and encode residual errors relative to models (Srinivasan et al., 1982; Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Schultz and Dickinson 2000) . Couched in terms of sensory perception, we can think of this as a process of unconscious inference (Helmholtz, 1911; Meulders, 2010) where higher cortical areas form abstract models, involving imperceptible latent variables (e.g. "there is an animal behind that tree") and then compare the predictions of these models with the actual sensory input. At the neuroanatomical level, (Mumford, 1992) considered the peculiar fact that most regions of cortex have reciprocal connections, not just projecting "upward" to higher regions that appear to process more abstract representations, but also "downward" or "backward" to lower regions that provide its raw data (Figure 3 ). Mumford argued that higher regions build an abstract model or "template" of the current scene, and then project this template (the prediction) onto lower layers. These lower regions then compute the discrepancy between their actual input and this template back up to higher regions, and an iterative process then attempts to minimize the discrepancy. Mumford hypothesized that this process continues forward from sensory regions to high-level frontal and associative regions of the brain. A predictive coding framework is able to make sense of several well-known phenomena in neuroscience that are puzzling from other perspectives. For example, many cells in visual cortex can be characterized by sensitivity to some feature (e.g. orientation, color) within a limited receptive field (a small portion of visual space to which they respond). Higher areas then combine multiple features and/or multiple receptive fields. But such cells often also exhibit the peculiar phenomenon of "endstopping": an orientation-sensitive cell fires eagerly to a short bar of the correct orientation but decreases its firing to a longer bar extending outside its receptive field (Huber and Wiesel, 1965; 1968) . Such cells are particularly abundant in layers 2 and 3 of visual cortex, which project mainly to higher cortical areas, and are found both in V1 and higher visual areas (V2, V4 and MT). Rao & Ballard realized that end-stopping can be well-explained in predictive terms (Rao and Ballard, 1999) . If a bar stretches across the receptive fields of multiple cells, higher-level areas can infer its presence, send this "template" back to the lower areas, which then have less residual error and decrease their firing. In contrast, when a bar is short enough to fit within a single cell's receptive field, there is little redundancy with neighboring cells, and a much larger residual from the overall prediction generated by higher areas. Rao & Ballard used these principles to create a hierarchical predictive model whose simulated cells both developed "classical" receptive fields, and showed endstopping.
Analogous predictive principles are now known to describe many other neural systems, including sensorimotor control (Franklin and Wolpert, 2011) and the sensing of electromagnetic fields by electric fish (Heiligenberg, 1991; Sawtell et al., 2005; Bell et al., 2008) . Electric fish generate weak electrical fields using modified muscle tissue, and use receptors sensitive to tiny modifications of those fields to sense prey and conspecifics. However, changes in the field generated by the fish's own movements are orders of magnitude larger than those generated by the outside world. To compensate, these fish use predictive coding to subtract away the effects that should be generated by their own movements (a form of efference copy). This example of predictive coding provides an interesting evolutionary perspective, because electrical sensing of this kind has evolved at least twice (in mormyriform and gymnotiform fishes, two unrelated clades), but in both cases uses the same essential predictive principles, implemented in the same brain region (analogous to our cerebellum). Thus, despite the species-specificity of the electrical system itself, the same overarching principles of neural computation independently recur.
Predictive Systems in Cognitive Neuroscience
Turning now to a more global cognitive level, the well-studied phenomenon of mismatch sensitivity provides a nice example where the predictions occur in time, rather than space (Neville et al., 1991; Friederici et al., 1993; Baldwin and Kutas, 1997) . The brain appears to be exquisitely sensitive to surprises, and these are manifested at the skull surface in changes in the electrical signal measured by electroencephalography (EEG) and/or the magnetic signal measured by magnetoencephalography (MEG). In such studies, it has long been known that surprising auditory stimuli elicit a mismatch negativity (MMN), and that this occurs for a very wide class of repeated auditory stimuli, whenever something unpredictable given the previous events occurs. For example, an MMN can be elicited by a simple series of constantfrequency beeps if beep frequency is changed (Tervaniemi, 2003) . However, and more interestingly, if a series of beeps is played where every fifth beep is lower in frequency, the MMN elicited by the low beep quickly disappears, and now re-appears if all five beeps are set to the same frequency (Wacongne et al., 2011) . These results indicate that the brain is constantly computing residuals from its expectations, at multiple time scales; the MMN is an external indicator of such hierarchical predictive coding. Recent research suggests that this global phenomenon provides a nice bridge to neuronal-level phenomena such as spiketiming dependent plasticity, that can in turn be understood at the level of single-cell phenomena such as long-term potentiation via NMDA channels (Wacongne et al., 2012) .
Perhaps the most intriguing example of the value of predictive systems theory in cognition comes, as mentioned previously, from the restatement of the Rescorla-Wagner equation in neural terms (Schultz and Dickinson 2000; Schultz, 2002; . This research has focused on recordings from dopaminergic cells in the mammalian midbrain, which have very broad axonal arbors encompassing most of the forebrain (both cortex and basal ganglia). Dopamine is an important neurotransmitter for encoding reward, and plays key roles in learning and addiction in humans and animals. The firing rate of these dopaminergic neurons appears, to a good approximation, to directly encode the prediction error term (lambda -V) of the Rescorla-Wagner model. Reward translates to firing rate in a signed fashion (decreasing firing rate or increasing it from a baseline rate of 3-5 spikes/sec), enabling the coding of both presence of unpredicted rewards and absence of predicted rewards (Schultz, 2013) , as required by standard predictive models.
As already discussed earlier, the predictions driving dopaminergic firing are highly cognitive (or as Schultz (2013) puts it "model-based"). Whenever the two conflict, prediction error seems to be based on subjective predictions rather than objective ones (cf. Berridge, 2007; Matsumoto and Takada, 2013) . For example, dopaminergic neurons react to the subjective reward value (discounted for time), rather than the actual amount of food reward. Similarly, when stimuli are presented near sensory thresholds, dopaminergic firing encodes subjective presence or absence of stimuli (rather than their actual physical presence or absence). Again, predictive systems theory provides a framework to understand this important marriage of learning theory with neuroscience: Organisms predict what will happen, and they learn most when reality deviates from their predictions. Overall, the brain attempts to model the incoming sensory input by building internal models, and then comparing these models with the current incoming data. When the brain succeeds in perfectly predicting the world, the error is zero, and no learning occurs (and dopamine flows at its normal average rate). When unexpected rewards occur (positive reinforcement), dopamine increases, and the system learns to anticipate variables that might predict that reward in the future. Conversely, when predicted rewards fail to occur, dopamine flow decreases, and parameter values that incorrectly predicted success are modified. I draw two lessons for cognitive science from predictive coding. First, the neural data illustrate the value of quantitative models, like Rescorla-Wagner, for helping to bridge the mind/brain gap. The fact that this model stems from behaviorist learning theory and has traditionally been couched in associationist terms is less important than the fact that it is explicit and makes detailed quantitative predictions that have been tested against experimental data. Such data show that learning is based on organism-internal models of the world, and can be very naturally interpreted in cognitive rather than behaviorist terms. In this case at least, explicit formal models, combined with experimental tests, have achieved what thirty years of qualitative argument after the cognitive revolution (not to mention three hundred years of philosophical argument between rationalists and empiricists) never accomplished: a rapprochement between opposing poles, and one that clearly favors cognitive interpretations. While animal learning theory, based on behavioral data alone, was not enough to achieve this (cf. Rescorla, 1988) , its combination with neural data was. This example thus provides a compelling argument for increased integration of cognitive and neural theory within the explicit cognitive framework of predictive systems theory. This framework also illustrates the necessity for a clear understanding of the organism's cognitive model, which generates the predictions. The predictive viewpoint stresses that representations are useful insofar as they generate predictions that can be compared with sensory data. From this perspective, cognitive differences among species may be determined mainly by the categories of model they are capable of building, rather than how they learn. While Bayesian frameworks and the predictive perspective provide formal specifications of how to use data to update models, neither provides an explicit framework within which models, and model-generating capacities, can themselves be formulated. In other words, cognitive neuroscience appears to have converged on a useful and neurally-grounded framework within which to consider model-based prediction error, but we still need a framework to make explicit how models themselves are implemented, and how modeling capacities vary from species to species.
To fulfill this need a different body of theory is required: the theory of computation. Despite having been formalized long ago (Turing, 1937) and playing a role in the birth of cognitive science (Chomsky, 1957; Miller, 2003) , its significance for cognitive science, and cognitive biology in particular, has been rather neglected outside of computational linguistics (cf. . I will argue that the theory of computation provides the right kind of framework to build and evaluate different types of computational models, and that such a framework is necessary if we want to understand why different species have different cognitive abilities. I suggest that the right way to frame these cognitive differences is in terms of the classes of models that different species are able to construct.
Understanding Species Differences
Cell-level computing and predictive coding are aspects of neural computation shared by most animal species. Nonetheless, it is a truism that some species' brains can do things that others cannot: from electroreceptive fish to echolocating bats to language-using humans, different species have different cognitive capacities and propensities well-suited to their ways of life. Species-specificity is as much the norm in animal cognition and behavior as in body form or physiology. Nonetheless, an implicit assumption in much of neuroscience, as well as traditional animal learning theory, is that differences between species are only quantitative: a species may have more or faster learning, or better memory, but the learning rules or memory systems (and thus presumably the neural principles) remain the same. A tension between these views -of qualitative species differences versus quantitative neural differencespervades the cognitive sciences (particularly where the biology of human cognition is concerned). Unfortunately the debate has not included actual data from a variety of species often enough (cf. Fitch et al., 2010) to be well-grounded in biological reality.
We might hope that nervous systems work in essentially the same way across species, if only because we can never hope to understand human brain disease or solve clinical problems without appropriate animal models. The good news, at the neural level, is that many principles of the nervous system, from neurotransmitters to neuronal behaviour to developmental wiring principles, are indeed widely shared, and the neural similarities among closely related species (e.g. humans and chimpanzees) seem in most cases to be overwhelming. There is no reason to doubt that the principles reviewed so far (single-neuron computation and predictive Bayesian coding) apply equally to humans and chimpanzees (as well as mice and birds). Nonetheless, chimpanzees do not have language or music, any more than humans have echolocation or electrosensing, so some clear qualitative differences remain. A successful framework for comparative cognition must account for such differences, and attempt to link them to underlying neural differences.
By one account these qualitative differences derive, quantitatively, from differences in brain size. For many years it was suspected that raw brain size, or neuron number, might account for many of the differences in cognitive ability among vertebrates (Rensch, 1956; Jerison, 1973) . While brain size certainly cannot be ignored as a parameter for understanding the relationship between brain and cognitive capabilities, abundant comparative data show that it cannot provide the complete story. For example, birds typically have far smaller brains than mammals, and yet many perform at a cognitive level meeting or surpassing mammals with much larger brains (Emery and Clayton, 2004) . Even more surprising, "mini-brains" such as that of the honeybee turn out to be capable of surprisingly abstract computations, such as the "same/different" distinction, previously thought to require large, complex brains (Giurfa et al., 2001) . This suggests, as ethologists have long recognized, that no simple "mass action" principles can explain the details of cognitive capacities, and that details of specific neural circuits are instead crucial.
This provides another excellent reason to put species-difference at center stage in cognitive biology. This is an extension of what Krebs has called the "August Krogh Principle": that for most biological problems there is a species in which the problem can be best-studied (Krebs, 1975) . Finding a closely related pair of species, similar in most ways but differing in some crucial respect, can provide a powerful lens to isolate the mechanistic basis for that difference. By extending Krogh's principle to pairs of species where one possesses and one lacks the trait in question, we can hone in on the crucial differences using all the tools of modern neuroscience and genetics. Nice examples of this comparative principle include the use of bird species that are or are not vocal learners to find the neural basis for vocal learning (Wild, 1993; Jarvis, 2004) or the comparison between monogamous and polygynous voles to discover the neural and genetic basis of male parental care and mate fidelity (Insel and Shapiro, 1992; Insel et al., 1994; McGraw and Young, 2009 ). Thus, species differences are not only a reality we must face, but given a good choice of species also provide a powerful and promising avenue to better understanding cognition and its mechanistic basis.
How can one approach the question of species differences scientifically? Specifically, how can we determine which of the myriad details that differ from one brain to another actually make a cognitive difference? Two classes of answer will be important: motivational and representational differences. Motivational species differences concern what is attended to and what sorts of actions come naturally (biting, prehension, flight…, cf. Breland and Breland, 1961) . Representational differences reflect the type of models an organism is equipped to construct, and how different model components are linked (Garcia and Koelling, 1966) . Such models, from a Bayesian viewpoint, can be used by the organism to bootstrap its probabilistic inferences about the world. Both of these classes of difference will have a strong innate component, but not in any fixed or reflexive sense. Rather, they provide the needed foundation for a bootstrapping process, constraining development in interaction with the environment (Fitch, 2011b) . Such innate species differences end up resulting, in the adult animal, in complex models that are certainly not present at birth, but which nonetheless depend on capacities and proclivities that are part of the species-typical cognitive makeup. Ultimately, we can be hopeful that a mature discipline of computational/cognitive neuroscience will provide mechanistic explanations for both classes of species difference, grounded at the level of neuronal physiology and circuitry.
Although both classes of species difference are important, I will focus here on differences in the modeling capacity of different species. A central goal is to understand the species differences that provide humans with the capacity to acquire music or language, and for these differences I suggest that differences in modeling capacity are of central importance.
The Theory of Computation: A Framework for Comparative Computational Neuroscience
Now, presenting the last component of my threefold framework, I argue that the theory of computation initiated by Turing provides an appropriate framework for considering modeling capacity, especially important when considering high-level pattern perception of the sort typifying human music and language. In particular the well-established branch of the theory of computation called formal language theory provides an excellent starting point for experimental investigation of the cognitive abilities of different species. Although I hope deployment of this theory will lead, in time, to a "naturalized" theory of computation in living tissue, we are far from such a theory at present.
The Theory of Computation and Formal Language Theory
There are two main components of the modern theory of computation: formal language theory (FLT) and the theory of algorithms (TOA). Focusing on FLT, I provide a short nontechnical overview below, since the discipline is well-covered in widely-available computer science textbooks (Gersting, 1999; Hopcroft et al., 2000; Linz, 2001; Levelt, 2008) and shorter recent reviews Jäger and Rogers, 2012) . Accessible popular treatments are also available (Berlinski, 2001; Dyson, 2012) .
FLT is essentially the study of infinite sets generated by finite means, a characterization that makes its significance for music or language clear. The field had its start in pure mathematics in the early 20 th century, when mathematicians sought to understand how the (presumably infinite) set of true theorems and correct proofs, all building on a finite set of mathematical rules, could be generated. A crowning achievement of this endeavor was Turing's model of computation, now called a Turing Machine (Turing, 1937) . Although there were at the time multiple competing proposed models for computation including Emil Post's rewrite systems (Post, 1944) or Alonzo Church's lambda calculus (Church, 1936) , it rapidly became clear that all of them can generate the same infinite set of propositions/proofs, and thus were all formally equivalent. Although each variant is still used today, it is now common to use the Turing machine as a stand-in for all of these, and indeed all imaginable, formal computational models. "Turing equivalence" thus defines the outer reach of anything that can be clearly specified as an algorithm.
In the meantime another body of theory was developing, adopting a more practical or statistical perspective, that included simpler models such as Markov processes and regular grammars (Kleene, 1938; . Unlike the all-powerful systems of Turing, such models were explicitly limited in power and complexity, both to allow better understanding, and aid practical applications. These again constitute a large class of computational systems, sometimes called finite-state systems (Chomsky and Miller, 1958) , which again can generate infinite sets of strings using a finite set of rules, but in this case which have clear limitations. For instance, the simple string pattern A n B n , in which the number of A's is precisely matched by the number of B's, can easily shown to be beyond the capability of any finite-state system (Miller and Chomsky, 1963) , although any such string could be identified, given adequate time and patience, by a human crossing off alternate A's and B's, one by one (or equivalently by a person counting the number of A's, and the number of B's, and comparing the final counts). Other more interesting limitations are that finite-state systems cannot recognize mirror symmetry in an arbitrary string (e.g. "abc|cba"), or even simple repetition of an arbitrary string ("abca|abca"). Thus, despite their considerable power, finite state systems do not appear to be adequate to model human mental capacities in toto.
Supra-Regular Grammars
These two levels of computational power (finite-state and Turing-complete) define the innermost and outermost levels of the modern formal language hierarchy (Fig. 4) . But it became clear in the 1950's that these alone are too coarse for categorizing the many various algorithms that began to arise as computers became more powerful, or the problems raised by considering human languages as infinite sets of sentences generated by finite means. This led Noam Chomsky and his colleagues to define two intermediate levels of power, captured by so-called "context sensitive" and "context free" grammars. The latter, abbreviated CFGs, are particularly important from a modern comparative perspective because (as we will see below) they appear to embody a type of tree-oriented computation that humans find very natural, but that other species find challenging or impossible (Miller, 1967; .
Context free grammars are classically defined, following (Post, 1944) , in terms of "rewrite rules" which allow one string to be rewritten as another string, given certain restrictions. Different classes of grammars are defined by allowing some types of conditions and not others. For example, a context-free grammar can include rules such as A -> A B C which says to rewrite the string 'A' as the string 'A B C'. However, a rule such as z A -> A B C which indicates that A can be so rewritten only when preceded by a z is called "context sensitive", and such rules are forbidden in CFGs. This restriction provides a powerful bonus: it means that it is easy to build fast, efficient parsers for CFGs, in contrast to unrestricted context-sensitive or higher systems (Hopcroft et al., 2000) . Thus, all modern computer languages are based on CFGs, which have become an indispensable practical tool in computer science (Savage, 1998; Gersting, 1999; Linz, 2001) . Context-sensitive grammars have fewer practical applications.
Adding these two new classes of grammars, intermediate between the finite-state and Turingcomplete levels, leads to the "standard" formal language hierarchy presented in textbooks (often called the Chomsky Hierarchy -though it would be equally correct to call it the Turing/Chomsky/Kleene hierarchy). However, this was not the end of the story: at each level of this hierarchy finer distinctions have now been made, including a finer subdivision of the finite-state zone into the so-called "subregular hierarchy" (Jäger and Rogers, 2012) . It also turns out that, although most components of most human languages can be captured relying solely on finite-state and context-free representations, multiple languages exhibit features that go slightly beyond the power of these systems (in particular, so-called crossing dependencies in Dutch or Swiss German). This led to the codification of an important new supra-regular level: the "mildly context sensitive" (MCS) languages (Shieber, 1985; Stabler, 2004) . In an interesting reprise of the original convergence of the Turing/Church/Post approaches to computation, multiple contemporary formalisms for writing natural language grammars turn out again to converge at this new level, and are thus formally equivalent (Joshi et al., 1991; Vijay-Shanker and Weir, 1994) . The formal language hierarchy is thus not a fixed edifice, but a work in progress: an extendable roadmap for understanding what types of rules and computations are available to systems with particular capacities and limitations.
A crucial virtue of the theory of computation is that it defines formal equivalence classes of several sorts. First, as already mentioned, it provides a well-codified sense in which two approaches can be shown to be "formally equivalent". In the cognitive sciences, we need a shared framework for deciding if two superficially different modeling frameworks are simply notational variants of one another. Once we know this, the choice between the frameworks becomes a matter of taste and convenience rather than vehement debate. Examples of such notational variants include modern programming languages, Turing machines and Post rewrite systems (all are Turing equivalent) or multiple modern grammatical formalisms (such as minimalism, tree-adjoining grammars, and combinatory categorial grammars) which all predict the same MCS linguistic extensions (Vijay-Shanker and Weir, 1994; Stabler, 2004) .
A second important type of equivalence occurs between rule systems and processing algorithms -between abstract descriptions of rules and the machines ("automata") that can compute them (Minsky, 1967; Hopcroft et al., 2000; Linz, 2001 ). If we can show that a particular problem can be described with a regular grammar, Kleene's theorem tells us we can solve that problem using a finite-state automaton (Kleene, 1956) . Thus, once we can define the problem, we can say what type equipment we need to solve it. Correspondingly, if we can model a given machine at the formal automaton level, we automatically know about its computational capacities and limitations.
The Supra-Regular Hypothesis for Human Music and Language
A founding insight of both cognitive science and modern linguistics is that all human languages require supra-regular computational resources (resources above the finite-state level) (Chomsky, 1956; . This means that although a finite-state automaton can solve many useful problems (e.g. learn a lexicon, recognize word strings, etc.) there is a substantial class of problems that it cannot solve. These include all aspects of language in which flexible, extendable trees are needed as data structures, or where tree-identification and processing are core computational problems. For systems which rely strongly upon flexible, nested hierarchical structure, as do language and music, such tree-based processing is indispensable. Thus, most current computational linguistic models of language take the existence of both tree structures, and context-free processing resources, for granted (e.g., Johnson and Riezler, 2002; Perfors et al., 2010) . Similarly, modern computer language compilers typically involve two steps: a finite-state "tokenizer" (or word recognition system) and a context-free "parser" which recognizes syntactic structures built up from these tokens (Aho et al., 1986; Appel, 1998) .
Evaluating the results of the earliest experiments exploring human artificial grammar learning, psychologist George Miller reached the conclusion that human participants appear to have a bias to employ context-free solutions even when these are not required by the data. In Miller's words:
"constituent structure languages are more natural, easier to cope with, than regular languages... The hierarchical structure of strings generated by constituent-structure grammars is characteristic of much other behavior that is sequentially organized; it seems plausible that it would be easier for people than would the left-to-right organization characteristic of strings generated by regular grammars" (p. 140, Miller, 1967) where "constituent structure languages" refers to supra-regular (context-free or above) grammars. Thus, updating to use modern terminology (cf. we can restate George Miller's conclusion as the Supra-Regular Hypothesis for human cognition:
"When presented with sets of strings, humans have a both a capacity and proclivity to infer hierarchical structures wherever possible" Because the term "hierarchical" can be interpreted in many ways, we need some definitions in order to make this hypothesis precise. 6.4 "Hierarchy", "Trees" and Context-Free Grammars Here are two definitions to clarify more precisely the interpretations employed here:
Hierarchical Structure: A structure whose graph takes the form of a rooted tree Rooted Tree: An acylic, fully-connected graph with a designated root node Although regular grammars can construct trees, they are of a depauperate sort (Levelt, 1974) : either exclusively right-or left-branching. In other word, all recursive rules in a regular grammar must have the same form e.g.:
S -> S a which allows them to generate "tail-recursive" trees that branch indefinitely off to the right. In contrast, a context-free grammar allows rules of the form:
S -> a S b
It is important to note that not all rules of a CFG need to have this form: a single one is enough to render the entire grammar supra-regular. The crucial advantage allowed by such rules is that they can generate trees with any arbitrary structure. Right-, left-, or both branches are allowed, and CFGs by no means entail strictly center-embedded structures. Thus, any syntactic system allowing a rich variety of tree structures is most compactly described in supra-regular terms. All natural languages, and most modern computer languages (C, Java, Python, …) fall into this category.
Although our understanding of the computational nature of human music is not as advanced as that of language, most theorists agree that music, like language, possesses rich hierarchical structure at multiple levels (e.g. melody, rhythm and harmony) and that this is a central computational similarity between music and language (Martin, 1972; Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983; Longuet-Higgins, 1994; Patel, 2003; Rohrmeier, 2011; Honing, 2012; Koelsch, 2012; Lerdahl, 2013) . Like language, music makes "infinite use of finite means" by combining a limited set of atomic notes into riffs, measures, phrases, and movements of greater and greater scope. These arbitrary hierarchical structures require supra-regular grammars to be concisely notated (Steedman, 1984; Rohrmeier, 2011 ). Miller's hypothesis can therefore be tentatively generalized to include music. The supra-regular hypothesis thus has a multidomain scope, including at least language and music.
In summary, Miller's supra-regular hypothesis holds that humans confronted with a set of strings first attempt to find some general rules by which hierarchical structures can be inferred for those strings. The theory of computation allows us to conclude both that such rules require a modeling system with supra-regular capacities (i.e., a context-free grammar or better), and that such a system requires computing machinery with powers beyond that of any finite-state machine (e.g., a "push-down automaton" or better (Gersting, 1999; Hopcroft et al., 2000) ). But what of other species? Do non-human animals also infer tree structures when confronted with strings?
Supra-Regularity and Animal Cognition
In 1999, as a post-doc at MIT, it occurred to me that formal language theory could be employed as a framework for animal cognitive experiments designed to answer precisely this question. At that time, ongoing experiments with human infants using the paradigm of artificial grammar learning (AGL) were producing exciting insights into the patternrecognition capacities of infants (Saffran et al., 1996; Marcus et al., 1999) . Artificial grammar learning, in its classic form (Reber, 1967) , involves generating a set of strings using some set of rules (the "grammar"), and exposing participants to members of this set. The subsequent "test phase" involves presenting novel grammatical strings and ungrammatical violations, to determine what rules the participants acquired (if any). For infants and/or animals, this paradigm can be combined with habituation/discrimination techniques to provide a powerful empirical platform for pattern learning studies. Habituation techniques make use of the simple fact that organisms repeatedly exposed to similar stimuli habituate to them (itself a reflection of the predictive systems approach to the brain/mind). When a novel stimulus differing from predecessors is then presented, the organism will "dis-habituate" if it recognizes the novelty, and show a renewed response. Since dishabituation requires that the organism both infer some commonality in the previous stimulus set, and recognize that this commonality is lacking in the novel stimulus, it provides an excellent way to probe pattern learning and discrimination in a nonverbal organism, with no need for extensive training (Eimas et al., 1971; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1988) .
Despite a very large literature using AGL, there had been very little attention to the regular/supra-regular distinction since Miller's initial "Grammarama" experiments (Miller, 1958; . Indeed the vast majority of human artificial grammar research used roughly the same grammar as that introduced by Arthur Reber in the first AGL research (Reber, 1967 ) -a moderately-complex finite-state grammar. I thus began considering performing AGL experiments with artificial languages going beyond finite-state. Although there are many supra-regular candidates, I first thought of the context-free grammar A n B n as a simple grammar, which generates such strings as {AA BB, AAA BBB, etc.}. The recognition of this grammar is beyond the capacities of finite-state automata, because such machines have no way to keep track of an arbitrary number of past As in order to match them with the same number of Bs. I first tested a few human participants to ensure that they could master such a grammar, which they did without apparent effort (for both tone and syllable strings). I then teamed up with Marc Hauser at Harvard, who ran a lab already testing cognition in cottontop tamarin monkeys (Saguinus oedipus), including AGL experiments. As a control we used the regular grammar (AB) n , which generates strings like {AB, ABAB, ABABAB, …}. When exposed to the monkeys were able to recognize the pattern, as evidenced by more frequent looks to novel stimuli violating this pattern. In contrast, despite repeated testing with several different string types (tones, syllables), these monkeys failed to recognize the supra-regular A n B n grammar (Fitch and Hauser, 2004) .
The publication of this study launched a wave of further experimentation combining AGL and FLT, in both humans and multiple animal species ten Cate and Okanoya, 2012) . In an unfortunate terminological confusion, the issue of regularity was confused with that of "recursion", such that many researchers have attempted to use success on the A n B n grammar as evidence for recursive processing in animals (Gentner et al., 2006; Marcus, 2006; Abe and Watanabe, 2011; Rey et al., 2012) . Similarly, some researchers have confused the capacity for context-free grammars as implying pure center-embedded structures (Perruchet and Rey, 2005; Rey et al., 2012) , rather than the flexible and general class of structures that CFGs are capable of. Center-embedded sentences nest phrases in the midst of other phrases, and are well-known to be very challenging to parse beyond two levels of embedding. For example, in the sentence "White is the color that the painter that Fred hired prefers" involves embedding the phrase "that Fred hired" in the center of the phrase "the color that the painter prefers". Because this process cannot be extended indefinitely without a loss of comprehension ("White is the color that the painter that the neighbor Fred hates hired prefers" is already borderline), center-embedding has long been considered to be a borderline phenomenon in psycholinguistics, perhaps grammatical in theory but unparsable in practice (Miller and Chomsky, 1963; Bach et al., 1986) . But nothing limits context-free grammars to such center-embedded structures: a flexible mixture of right-and left-branching and center-embedding is possible. Nor does A n B n need to be center-embedded (with links between particular As and Bs) to be context-free (see below, and cf. .
Such misunderstandings and confusions are perhaps to be expected in the early days of a new paradigm, but it is unfortunate that they have obscured what I take to be the main conclusion of this body of research: that those non-human species that have been tested so far do not seem to have the same propensity as human subjects to perceive strings as hierarchically structured, and as a result find the simple but supra-regular A n B n language difficult, or impossible, to identify. This appears to be true regardless of the sensory domain, and occurs whether the strings are made of human speech syllables, conspecific vocalizations, or abstract visual tiles (Fitch and Hauser, 2004; van Heijningen et al., 2009; Stobbe et al., 2012) . In contrast, in many different experiments with a variety of stimulus types, humans easily and intuitively master A n B n and other supra-regular grammars (Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Perruchet and Rey, 2005; Friederici et al., 2006; Bahlmann et al., 2008; de Vries et al., 2008; Hochmann et al., 2008; Udden et al., 2012) .
The Dendrophilia Hypothesis
Although many species and many grammars remain to be tested, the current results thus provide tentative grounds to consider an extension of Miller's supra-regular hypothesis (which concerned humans alone) to one with a broader comparative scope. This hypothesis seeks to characterize the cognitive difference between humans and (some) other species in terms of the class of models that we can build to make sense of stimuli. In particular, I suggest that humans have a species-typical, multi-domain inclination to infer tree structures as our underlying model for string sets, but that this is not the case for most animal species.
Because the core notion here is that "humans love trees" I call this broader hypothesis the Dendrophilia Hypothesis:
"Humans have a multi-domain capacity and proclivity to infer tree structures from strings, to a degree that is difficult or impossible for most non-human animal species" This hypothesis incorporates the core observation in Miller's supra-regular hypothesis, but explicitly limits the hypothesis phylogenetically, suggesting that our dendrophilia is unusual from a comparative perspective. The dendrophilia hypothesis explicitly extends human supra-regular proclivities to non-linguistic domains such as music (and, more tenuously, visual pattern perception, cf. Westphal-Fitch et al., 2012) . To the extent that this hypothesis is correct, it provides a unified computational account of the difference that allows our species, and not others, to acquire language: that we infer trees over linguistic or musical strings, and that this allows us to compute probabilities and infer higher-order rules that would be essentially invisible to a species that does not do so.
Summarizing, with the dendrophilia hypothesis I attempt to isolate and characterize an important cognitive difference between our species and others which, I argue, helps explain why a human infant easily acquires language but a cat, dog or monkey raised in the same household does not. Although some animals can acquire large vocabularies, e.g. several hundred object labels in dogs and chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993; Kaminski et al., 2004; Pilley and Reid, 2011; Griebel and Oller, 2012) , these species appear to be limited in their capacity to infer larger-scale hierarchical syntactic structures over these word strings (cf. Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993) . In the context of the (broadly-shared) Bayesian framework discussed earlier, this would mean that probability distributions over trees simply are not computed by dogs or chimpanzees, not because they can't compute probabilities, but because they don't infer the trees in the first place. Given the centrality of tree-centered probability distributions in modern computational linguistics, this would constitute a fatal limitation in acquiring a human language. This limitation presumably results from differences in brain structure between humans and animals that we will consider in the final section.
Employing Formal Language Theory in Behavioral Experiments
Before turning to some of the implications of the previous discussion, it is important to forestall several areas of confusion which have caused unnecessary and unproductive debate in the past. The first is the mistaken notion that the research programme on animal AGL described above concerns "recursion". Because recursivity is at the heart of any system that generates infinite sets with finite means, every level of the formal language hierarchy by definition permits recursive rules. In a finite-state grammar such recursive rules are limited to the form S -> S a (so-called "tail recursion"), and the structures they build are uniformly right-or left-branching trees. But they are defined recursively nonetheless. In contrast, the A n B n grammar can be simply defined by defining two counters for the number of As and Bs, and comparing these numbers when the end of the string is reached. Although this approach provably supra-regular, and cannot be captured by a finite-state automaton, it is not what would typically be defined as a recursive definition. The contrast between finite-state and supra-regular grammars is thus a poor test of recursivity, and was never proposed as such in the original Fitch & Hauser paper. In short, "recursion" and "supra-regularity" are independent axes along which a computational system can be classified, and should not be confused (cf. Fitch, 2010b; .
Another issue concerns a misguided criticism that A n B n can be solved trivially by "just counting". While, as just observed, this grammar can indeed be solved via counting, this is by no means a trivial fact because, as proven by Minsky in 1967, an automaton possessing two integer counters plus some simple increment and comparison operators is in fact Turing equivalent (Chp 14: Minsky, 1967) . In the theory of computation, two counters and a comparison operator go a long way, and such resources are far from trivial, since a few more operators generates a Turing-equivalent computational system. A related confusion concerns "center embedding". The central difference between a contextfree and regular grammar concerns the form of recursive rules allowed, which indeed allows CFGs to build, among other things, center-embedded structures. However, CFGs can generate trees using any combination of right-branching, left-branching and centerembedded structures. Thus what makes these grammars important is their generality: their capacity to generate arbitrary tree structures. There was a flurry of debate about whether human subjects automatically infer center-embedded structures for A n B n strings, after (Perruchet and Rey, 2005) found that their human subjects did not. First, multiple studies now show that humans are perfectly capable of inferring and extending such centerembedded structures, when provided with the proper training and exemplars (Bahlmann et al., 2008; Udden et al., 2012) . Second, for reasons just explained, a failure to acquire such structures does not imply that these subjects failed to learn A n B n ! Finally, in addition to the "count and compare" and center-embedding solutions for the A n B n language, it is equally legitimate to infer "crossed" dependencies, of a sort that can also be inferred by human participants (Udden et al., 2012) . In short, it is an error to think that the supra-regularity of the A n B n language, which concerns a set of strings, hangs on any particular structural interpretation of those strings. Center embedding is indeed an interesting phenomenon, but researchers interested in investigating it should design experiments using mirror or palindrome grammars, where center-embedded structure is explicitly required, than continuing to investigate A n B n .
The final, and more interesting, empirical issue concerns the type of evidence required to conclude that a learner has in fact acquired a supra-regular grammar. Showing this involves more than simply showing above-chance recognition of strings generated by a given grammar, because there are often regular grammars (or combinations thereof) that can successfully accept most A n B n strings and reject many others. For example, in a comparison limited to A n B n and (AB) n grammars, several simple regular patterns can distinguish between these strings (for example, simply accepting the bigrams 'AA' and 'BB' will allow AABB or AAABBB strings to be accepted, while rejecting ABAB or ABABAB strings). Thus, it is necessary to design a careful set of probe trials that are beyond reach of such simple strategies. In this case, the crucial control condition is composed of "mismatched" A*B* strings where the number of As and Bs is unequal . Because such patterns cannot be rejected by most regular strategies, successful rejection of such patterns by a subject is required before the conclusion of supra-regularity is warranted (Gentner et al., 2006; Stobbe et al., 2012) .
A related issue concerns generalization over n, which is again required to infer a supraregular strategy. While we don't expect any organism (human or otherwise) that has acquired the A n B n grammar to accept string with arbitrarily large ns (e.g. 100 As and 100 Bs), we do expect some generalization over whatever ns have been observed. That is, if animals are trained with n = 2 or 3 (e.g. A 2 B 2 and A 3 B 3 strings) they would need to generalize over n, accepting patterns of the form A 4 B 4 , before we could conclude that they have learned A n B n . This is because the union of two regular grammars -A 2 B 2 U A 3 B 3 -is still a regular grammar, and there is no reason to expect a subject employing it to generalize it to accept A 4 B 4 strings (Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Gentner et al., 2006; Stobbe et al., 2012) . Thus, an empirical demonstration of supra-regularity for such grammars involves both generalization to new stimulus lengths (generalization over n in the case of A n B n ) and rejection of carefully chosen "foil" stimuli (for that grammar, strings with mismatched number of As and Bs). Such minimal requirements have not been met by some recent experiments (Perruchet and Rey, 2005; Rey et al., 2012) , and this renders unsubstantiated the claim that "baboons parse supraregular grammars" (much less that made by the authors that "baboons have recursion"). For critiques of other recent claims of animal supra-regularity see (van Heijningen et al., 2009; Beckers et al., 2012; ten Cate and Okanoya, 2012) .
Summary
I conclude by recapping the overall point of this section: formal language theory provides a rigorous, explicit framework (along with a concise notation and a large body of theorems and practical experience) within which core questions concerning the nature of neural computation can be framed and more importantly tested in multiple species. The current data support Miller's supra-regular hypothesis concerning human's ability (and propensity) to infer hierarchical structures over strings, and suggest my dendrophilia hypothesis, that humans but not most other species habitually and easily infer trees from string sets. But although the recent debate has been focused on the finite-state/supra-regular distinction, this should not blind us to the fact that there are many other regions of formal langauge space worth exploring. Current data suggest that the sub-regular language hierarchy may prove more fruitful in the long run particularly relevant to the domains of phonology and for many aspects of music.
Why should the capacity to represent and manipulate trees represent such an important difference between species? The answer has to do with representing hierarchical systems in an efficient and extendable way. A hierarchical representation is "chunked" into subparts, with the labels for the subparts corresponding to higher-level nodes in the tree. Such a representation allows these higher-level abstractions to be repeated, reorganized and generalized, allowing greater flexibility than a simple sequential list of elements (Simon, 1962) . Complex motor planning (e.g. for sophisticated tool making), language and music all involve tree representations, because they all rely on hidden but important intermediate-level organization that must be inferred if the visible sequential surface (the terminal "leaves" of the tree) is to be correctly parsed or executed. Although sequences can of course be memorized into a simple list, parsing them into tree structures with hidden higher-level nodes can provide a more compact "description language" for a large set of sequences than does a simple list. Tree-based representations also allow flexible and creative extension of the system by rearranging sub-trees. A system that has inferred the higher order hidden structure {subject-verb-object}, after learning and parsing "Jim chases John," can easily generate "John chases Jim" as well, even if that sentence has never been heard. Thus, I argue that the capacity to represent and manipulate trees is a core human ability, shared across multiple cognitive domains, and valuable because it provides a "description language" that is both highly compressible, and broadly extensible.
Synthesis: A Neurocomputational Framework for a Cognitive Biology of Music and Language
I conclude with an illustration, putting the proposed neuro-computational framework to a more specific use, focused on the biology of music and language. The overarching question is one that has occupied a central place in cognitive science since its origin:
"What are the biological pre-requisites for language acquisition?"
This has been a recurrent (and polarizing) question for many decades. The ultra-behaviorist answer [ (Skinner, 1957) was essentially "nothing more than standard conditioning, and the right environment", while the answer from generative linguists has long been "a suite of special purpose systems, and a good dose of innate knowledge" (Chomsky, 1965) . But underlying these apparently irreconcilable viewpoints are large areas of agreement: everyone recognizes that a kitten, raised in a human home, will not learn language but that a normal child will. There can be little doubt that this difference has a strong genetic component, which results from differences between the nervous system of kittens and babies. The key questions concern the computational nature of the prerequisites for language acquisition, how they support learning (at least of vocabulary), their neural implementation, and which pre-requisites are shared with other animals. My colleagues and I have suggested elsewhere that most of the cognitive pre-requisites of language are in fact shared with other species, in some cases many other species (Hauser et al., 2002; Fitch, 2009; 2010a) , although this claim remains controversial Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005) . What is not particularly controversial is the proposition that, despite massive similarities in brain function between different species, some features of human brains enable us and not others to acquire language. What these features are is clearly an interesting question to which we would like to know the answer.
In this last section, I will explore some approaches to tackling this question, using the framework advanced above, and proposing several specific testable hypotheses. To forestall confusion and misunderstanding, note the important distinction between the framework detailed in the preceding pages, and the more speculative and tentative proposals made below. The value of the framework should be decided on its own terms, and not tied too hastily to the fate of the suggestions that follow. These suggestions may well be wrong, but the way to find out is to employ a rigorous, computational framework -my main focus above.
Language, Tree-Building and the Fronto-Sensory Scratchpad
The framework proposed here puts a central focus on tree-processing operations as a core necessity for music and language, and posits supra-regular processing power as the corresponding computational abstraction. It is natural to ask how such a system is implemented in neural hardware, within a predictive systems framework (Pulvermüller, 2010; Friederici, 2011) . While the answer to this question will remain tentative until a viable animal model for tree-processing is identified and studied, the best current candidate based on human research involves the bilateral peri-Sylvian network connecting the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, comprising Broca's area and its neighbors), with sensory and association regions in the temporal and parietal lobes. Unlike the "standard" cortico-cortical interconnections highlighted in the Mumford model between adjacent cortical regions, these represent longdistance connections connecting primitively premotor areas with sensory regions. These dorsal pathway connections (including the arcuate fasiculus and superior longitudinal fasiculusFriederici, 2009) have undergone considerable expansion and modification in recent human evolution, as evidenced by differences compared to both chimpanzees and macaques (Rilling et al., 2008) .
The first indication that something may be odd about the "motor" regions of the IFG came from the now well-documented observation that Broca's aphasics have difficulty not just in producing but in perceiving syntax (Caramazza and Zurif, 1976) , especially when semantic information is not available to disambiguate structure. With the rise of brain imaging it became clear that IFG activation is a typical aspect of structural processing in perception of both music (Koelsch et al., 2000; Maess et al., 2001; Koelsch et al., 2002) and language (Bookheimer, 2002; Hagoort, 2005b; Hickok, 2009; Friederici, 2011) . This finding is wellestablished, but we must nonetheless ask why a "premotor" region should play such a central role in an essentially perceptual process (cf. Shipp, 2005) .
One possibility is that the IFG serves as a kind of "abstract scratchpad" for the sensory predictive engine ensconced in the occipital and temporal cortices, allowing these to "offload" partial results computed during serial processing of hierarchical structures (cf. Pulvermüller, 2010; Fitch and Martins, 2014) . Thus, reverberations in the fronto-sensory feedback loop would play the role of the stack in the pushdown automaton implementing a context-free grammar. Thus, in addition to the standard hierarchical predictive engine, locally implemented in all sensory cortices, the posterior regions connected to the IFG would have an additional storage mechanism into which intermediate results (and in particular unfinished structural computations) could be placed for later retrieval. Consistent with this idea, IFG areas are increasingly activated as the size of the hierarchical structures processed increases, and this is true even with "Jabberwocky" sentences made up of nonsense content words, but incorporating normal function words (indicating grammatical structure) (Pallier et al., 2011) .
This IFG-as-stack model suggests that structural processing does not occur in Broca's region per se, but rather that a crucial aspect of this processing (the stack-based storage of intermediate results) is accomplished via a network of which Broca's is an important component. Note that the activation of the right inferior frontal region in musical syntax tasks is perfectly consistent with this hypothesis, and that this language/music parallel strengthens the notion that the fronto-sensory loop is centrally involved in structural, rather than semantic, processing (which is the focus of a ventral temporal lobe network). I have suggested elsewhere that the evolutionary origins of this fronto-sensory loop may be found in selection for complex vocal learning, which requires intimate informational exchange between auditory (temporal) and motor/premotor regions (Fitch, 2011a) . By this hypothesis, sensorimotor circuits that initially evolved for acoustically driven motor control were "exapted" later in our evolutionary history for use as an abstract fronto-sensory scratchpad, and this neural analog of a pushdown stack then became available for domain-general structural computation of the sort typical of music and language.
While Broca's area per se (BA 44/45) seems to be preferentially involved in phrasal syntax, surrounding areas play roles in both lower-level structure (phonology) and higher-level meaning (semantics). It thus seems prudent to consider the entire IFG, and not just Broca's region, as the fronto-sensory scratchpad (cf. Hagoort, 2005a; . Nonetheless, it is quite interesting to note that BA 44 and 45 specifically have undergone a spectacular enlargement in recent human evolution. Detailed cytoarchitectonic analysis of these areas in chimpanzees and humans indicates that BA 44 and 45 are present, in comparable locations, in chimpanzees (contra some earlier suggestions, e.g. Passingham, 1981) . However, these regions are among the most greatly expanded cortical areas yet identified in humans: left area 44 is 6.6 times larger in humans than in chimpanzees and left area 45 is 6.0 times larger (Schenker et al., 2010) . This is disproportionate compared to the overall increase in brain size: the average human brain is only roughly 3.5 times larger than that of a typical chimpanzee, and V1 is only 1.8 times larger in humans than in chimpanzees.
In summary, by this hypothesis, a direct link is made between the computational need for an augmented memory system (stack, queue or equivalent) in a supra-regular automaton, and Broca's area, a region that has undergone considerable expansion and rearrangement in recent human evolution. This additional memory system is implemented via a frontosensory scratchpad comprising the inferior frontal gyrus (centered on Broca's area) and posterior sensory regions, and by the enlarged long-distance fiber tracts connecting them. This hypothesis is consistent with "standard" models of the peri-Sylvian language regions (Geschwind, 1970; Hickok, 2009 ), but goes beyond them in drawing a more specific link between such neural circuitry and computational theory.
Identifying the Neurocomputational Changes Underwriting Structure Processing
The hypothesis above specifies a cytoarchitectonically-defined region as having apparent importance in a well-defined computation (stack-based tree building), but does not say why this region of cortex should play an important role. While a partial answer may simply be "because it has the right connections to other brain regions", it seems likely that the differences run deeper than that. For example, the IFG continues to play a key role in signed language, despite a completely different signaling modality, so it seems unlikely that the IFG circuit's importance derives solely from its strong connections to (auditory) temporal cortex. I suspect that another part of the answer derives directly from the original pre-motor functions of the IFG, which must influence the type of information flow within the multiple cortical regions it contains.
Another possibility, not mutually exclusive, is that relatively subtle changes in cellular morphology within the IFG lead to a phase transition in the types of computations the whole circuit can compute. This brings in the third, neuronal computing, aspect of my framework.
Consider again the changes in spiny cell morphology that result from inserting the human form of the FoxP2 gene into genetically-engineered mice (Enard et al., 2009; Vernes et al., 2011) . These cells, within the striatum, have significantly longer dendrites, and thus more extensive dendritic arbors than those in wild type mice. If something similar happened in cortical pyramical cells, it could serve to increase the receptive field size (spatial and/or temporal) of these neurons, and of whole cortical columns. Such subtle morphological changes, and/or changes in the expression pattern of particular ion channels within that dendritic arbor, could change the time constants of neurons, with the effect of enlarging their temporal receptive fields. Such changes would allow frontal neurons to process longer time chunks (and thus perceive longer-distance relationships) than a system with a narrower receptive field. Such an increase might lead in turn to an increase in the depth of abstract trees that could be represented (e.g. the number of levels of branching), and here even a single additional layer could add very considerable additional processing and expressive power.
While surely speculative, this hypothesis is explicit, and consistent with what little we know about how changes in DNA could effect neural computation via changes in cellular computation. It is also consistent with the broader principles of neural computation discussed above. In particular, this hypothesis highlights the potential importance of singleneuron computational properties in generating higher-order differences in the computations performed by larger brain regions. I strongly suspect that such explanatory cell-to-circuit principles are an important part of the bridge-building between neuroscience and cognition, even if the details of the hypothesis above turn out to be incorrect.
7.3 Evolutionary Origins: Where do the Constraints on "Universal Grammar" come from?
Finally, consider another highly contentious issue in the cognitive sciences: the degree to which humans can be said to have "innate knowledge" crucial for language acquisition. Generative linguists have termed this hypothetical knowledge-base "Universal Grammar" (Chomsky, 1965; Nowak et al., 2001; Jackendoff, 2002) . It is important to note that Chomsky's Universal Grammar was never intended to denote properties shared by all of the world's languages (contra Everett, 2005; Evans and Levinson, 2009 ). Rather, the term was introduced to denote the deeper cognitive principles underlying the acquisition of any language, presumably shared by all normal humans (cf. Fitch, 2011c) . Nonetheless, both "innate knowledge" and "Universal Grammar" have proven exceedingly controversial, so much that it is difficult to find calm discussion of the various issues raised by these concepts.
I personally find the terms "innate knowledge" and "Universal Grammar" somewhat misleading, with unfortunate implications that often obscure the crucial issues. Thus I will not defend the terms themselves, but instead concentrate on the important concepts underlying this long-running debate. Two key issues need to be clearly distinguished: 1) Constraints: What kinds of biological constraints are present in the child learning language, such that children so reliably converge on the correct meanings and structures of their language(s), and apparently avoid ever considering a huge number of logically possible alternative possibilities? 2) Species Specificity: What novel capacities and proclivities (e.g. novel representational formats) are available to the human mind, and not found in related species, that support the language acquisition process?
It is important to note that question one, concerning constraints, implies nothing about the constraints being specific to language, or specific to humans. The answer to this question could involve many inherited, reliably-developing ("innate") constraints which are shared with other species, and/or important in non-linguistic cognitive domains. In confronting the massive task of language acquisition, the child needs all the help it can get, and there are certainly many constraints available from ancient neural circuitry (e.g. for vision, audition, motor control, and social cognition) that could help disambiguate reference, avoid unrealistic or unnatural hypotheses, and generally speed the language-learner's progress towards parsing and understanding the language(s) of its community. They needn't be human-or language-specific. Thus, many important components of our biological endowment for language learning may be shared with other animals (Hauser et al., 2002; Fitch et al., 2005) . This is not a new idea: Chomsky (1965) proposed 'that proper names . . . must designate objects meeting a condition of spatio-temporal contiguity' or that 'color words of any language must subdivide the color spectrum into continuous segments' are plausible examples of formal universals, unrestricted to syntax or language. Indeed, the color example is clearly tightly bound to the sensory world of vision.
To make this possibility more explicit, I suggest that the human child brings a very significant biologically-given set of constraints to the language acquisition problem, constraints playing a central role in reducing the lexical, semantic and syntactic hypothesis space the child implicitly explores. By this proposal most if not all of these constraints are widely shared with other species. Indeed these innate constraints have evolved, like the vertebrate brain itself, over more than 100 million years to enable organisms to rapidly and effectively convert perceptual stimuli into useful predictive models about the environment. These constraints almost certainly represent a complex mosaic of many factors, all of them reliably developing in mammalian brains, in general. Thus the answer to question one, above, involves a large, complex and ancient set of Bayesian priors (visual, sensory, motor) that constrain inference in any mammalian brain, and are equally operative in the human brain. Such constraints provide an evolutionarily plausible route to solving the "poverty of the stimulus problem" (aka Plato's problem: "how do we learn so much given so little input?") by pushing the answer much further back in evolutionary time than the recent split between humans and chimpanzees. This proposal has the very attractive empirical implication that most such constraints can be explored via experimental work with nonhuman animals, and their neural, developmental and ultimately genetic bases uncovered. This proposal does not exclude the possibility that humans have additional, species-unique capacities (e.g. in the social cognition domain: Tomasello, 1999; Herrmann et al., 2007) , but it suggests that these are outweighed by more ancient and broadly-shared capacities.
This proposal is directly analogous to the situation in morphology. The human propensity to develop hands with five fingers is "innate" (reliably developing and genetically grounded), but there is nothing species-specific about this: five-digit forelimbs are a general tetrapod trait going back to very early land vertebrates (Daeschler et al., 2006; Shubin, 2008) . Like most aspects of human form, the biological roots of our hands run deep, and there is little evidence that our brains are much different. It is only the too-frequent conflation of "innate" with "species-specific" that obscures this likelihood, and makes my proposal about the shared nature of the biological constraints on language learning seem at all surprising.
Nonetheless, other vertebrates neither spontaneously develop language, nor acquire it from us with training. This suggests that, on top of a broad foundation of capacities shared with other species, humans have at least a few additional abilities (or propensities) that set us apart. Again, there is nothing unusual with observing that a species has unique traits: all species do. Nor does it seem controversial to suggest that humanity's most unusual traits are in the cognitive domain. Thus, although many of the biological pre-requisites of language acquisition are probably shared, computational capacities presumably remain that are uniquely well-developed in humans.
The "dendrophilia hypothesis" states that one of these core capacities is a novel (or greatly expanded) ability for tree-based computation. This tree-building capacity supplies the representational framework over which probabilities can be computed, using the more ancient Bayesian predictive framework that is widely shared. The hierarchicality of music suggests that the human propensity to process streams into trees is not unique to language; on the other hand little current evidence suggests that this propensity is shared with other primates (including chimpanzees). Thus, for example, the language-trained bonobo Kanzi uses and understands word order effectively (a feature visible at the surface level) but shows no evidence of deeper constraints involving phrase structure rules (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993) . The productions of other language-trained chimpanzees, such as Nim, show little evidence for any rule-based structure at all (Yang, 2013) . Human children, by contrast, seem to start out with rather superficial representations, requiring no hidden abstract categories, but by the age of three show clear evidence of such abstractions as "noun phrase" and "verb" (Bannard et al., 2009) .
As noted in Section 2.3, contemporary computational solutions to language acquisition all involve computation over trees (typically generated using context-free grammars). From a Bayesian viewpoint, this entails a model which computes probability distributions over arbitrarily large collections of trees (Pereira, 2000; Steedman, 2011; Johnson, 2013) ; a system confined to computations over surface strings will not suffice. This is consonant with the founding insight of generative linguistics: that linguistic rules operate over hierarchical structures, and not over words per se (Chomsky, 1957) . Thus, the dendrophilic drive of humans to parse strings into trees, compute probability distributions over those trees, and then use these to creatively generate novel structures (and the attendant strings) seems to be a prerequisite for language acquisition, clearly present in our species and limited in others.
I am not claiming that trees are nowhere to be found in animal cognition. I strongly suspect that trees form an important implicit component of motor control, navigation and perhaps social cognition in other primates, and I continue to hope that tree-structures may play some role in birdsong in at least some species. The difference, according to the dendrophilia hypothesis, is that we have neural circuitry that directly and flexibly encodes such tree structures, in an abstract and sensory-domain-independent manner. Since most animals possess some ability to represent serial order over the leaves of a tree, our unusual capacity must be in encoding hierarchical level (branching depth). Although my colleagues and I have previously discussed the generation of new levels in terms of "recursion" (Hauser et al., 2002) , I now regret this, since the connotation of unbounded generation of arbitrary-depth trees is not a necessity for dendrophilia (Fitch, 2010b) , but rather a mathematically concise way to get at what is a necessity, namely flexible tree-building allowing multiple nested hierarchical levels. This tree-building cognitive capacity may be less abstract and less powerful than full recursion, and potentially more empirically tractable. Note that neurally, it may be a relatively small evolutionary step to go from implicit trees, confined to particular cognitive and neural domains, to explicit, cross-domain trees (e.g. via the trans-cortical 'scratchpad" model developed above in Section 6.1).
Overall Conclusions
I conclude with a few comments about, and questions for, the future.
I have stressed the need for a computational approach to cognitive science that embraces a formally explicit and conceptually sophisticated theoretical framework. I observed that many long-running debates in cognitive science seem to be going nowhere because, lacking a clear and unambiguous theoretical framework capable of making testable quantitative predictions, they get mired in terminological morasses and in unhelpful dichotomies. Fortunately, there are abundant bodies of theory already available, in particular in single-neuron physiology, the theory of computation, and predictive systems theory, that fulfill many of the requirements for a rigorous, computationally-and biologically-grounded framework for cognitive science. As stressed initially, these islands of rigor discussed above by no means exhaust the store: game theory, network/graph theory, algorithmic complexity, and machine learning all provide important additional sources from outside "classical" cognitive science. Within cognitive science, music theory and linguistics both have pockets of rigorous theory ripe for connection to neural computation. Creating a framework incorporating bridging hypotheses to map between these various domains will allow cognitive biologists to generate and test explicit predictions about cross-species comparisons.
I have specifically highlighted the importance of tree-based computation in such a framework. At a high level this is because trees play a central and ineliminable role in human language and music, and thus provide one anchor at the cognitive end of the spectrum. At the other (microscopic) end, it is a simple fact that neurons have a tree-like form, and it has become clear in the last decades that this structure plays a central role in the cell-level computations they perform. Thus the form of individual neuronal computing elements, which must figure in any framework bridging the brain/mind gap, are also trees. It remains to be seen what, if any, link exists between the tree forms present at these cellular and cognitive poles, but I suspect that there are non-trivial connections between tree-based neural implementation and tree-oriented algorithms and computation. Finding out what they are will demand first acknowledging the facts of neuronal structure, and then exploring their potential implications for higher-level cognition at the algorithmic and computational levels. My personal hunch is that certain algorithms or representational formats will be more easily implemented in networks of tree-shaped computational elements than others, and therefore that at least some of the facts of cellular-level neuroscience will "percolate up" with implications for cognition and natural computation.
The goal of this overall endeavour is to someday create a field of computational cognitive biology able to answer questions like the following: -Why are many birds able to achieve the same cognitive abilities as many mammals, but using much smaller brains? -What specific neural changes enable some vertebrates, and not others, to be vocal learners? -Why can only a small fraction of animal species find a rhythmic beat in music, and entrain their own movements to it? -What specific neural differences between humans and chimpanzees enable one species and not the other to acquire complex linguistic syntax? This is just a small selection of my personal favorite questions, ones that will probably keep me occupied for the rest of my scientific career. But many more questions in this vein are easily generated ("left as an exercise for the reader"). A mature field of cognitive science should be able to ask, and answer, this broad class of questions in explicit, computational and neural terms. Fig 1: Marr's Three Levels Panel A), contrasted with the approach developed in the current paper (B and C) . See text for details. Fig 2: A) A real neuron (cortical pyramidal cell), contrasted with B) the "spherical neuron" traditional computing element, used in connectionist models and a C) more modern multicompartmental model of a neuron which acknowledges the computational complexity of single cells. Fig 3: A schematic illustration of the modern predictive perspective on cortical anatomy, following Mumford's (1991) insights, and those of many subsequent theorists. Rather than one way information flow (upper panel), the new model focuses on top-down predictions, and bottom-up signals representing the deviation from higher-level predictions (rather than raw sensory information itself).
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Fig 4:
The traditional formal language hierarchy is a nested inclusion hierarchy which allies classes of grammars (which are finite rule systems) and languages (the potentially infinite string-sets they generate) with the computational machinery minimally required to calculate that class.
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